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The research in Psychology and Economics (a.k.a. Behavioral Economics) suggests that individuals
deviate from the standard model in three respects: (i) non-standard preferences; (ii) non-standard beliefs;
and (iii) non-standard decision-making. In this paper, I survey the empirical evidence from the field
on these three classes of deviations. The evidence covers a number of applications, from consumption
to finance, from crime to voting, from giving to labor supply. In the class of non-standard preferences,
I discuss time preferences (self-control problems), risk preferences (reference dependence), and social
preferences. On non-standard beliefs, I present evidence on overconfidence, on the law of small numbers,
and on projection bias. Regarding non-standard decision-making, I cover limited attention, menu effects,
persuasion and social pressure, and emotions. I also present evidence on how rational actors -- firms,
employers, CEOs, investors, and politicians -- respond to the non-standard behavior described in the
survey. I then summarize five common empirical methodologies used in Psychology and Economics.
Finally, I briefly discuss under what conditions experience and market interactions limit the impact




549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
and NBER
sdellavi@econ.berkeley.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The core theory used in economics builds on a simple but powerful model of behavior. In-
dividuals make choices so as to maximize a utility function, using the information available,
and processing this information appropriately. Individuals’ preferences are assumed to be
time-consistent and independent of the framing of the decision.
Many attempts to test these assumptions through laboratory experiments in both the
psychology and the economics literature raise serious questions, though. In the laboratory,
individuals are time-inconsistent (Thaler, 1981), show a concern for the welfare of others
(Charness and Rabin 2002, Fehr and G¨ achter 2000), and exhibit an attitude toward risk that
depends on framing and reference points (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). They violate rational
expectations, for example by overestimating their own skills (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999) and
overprojecting from the current state (Read and van Leeuwen, 1998). They use heuristics to
solve complex problems (Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, and Weinberg, 2006) and are aﬀected by
transient emotions in their decisions (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003).
Unclear from these experiments, though, is how much these deviations from the standard
theory in the laboratory aﬀect economic decisions in the ﬁeld. In markets people hone their
behavioral rules to match the incentives they face and sort into favorable economic settings
(Levitt and List, fs2007). This is likely to limit the impact of deviations from the standard
model in markets. However, other forces are likely to increase the impact. important economic
decisions such as the choice of retirement savings or a house purchase are taken seldom, with
limited scope for feedback. In addition, ﬁrms often have incentives to accentuate the deviations
of consumers to proﬁt from them (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004).
The objective of this paper is to summarize a growing list of recent papers that document
aspects of behavior in market settings that also deviate from the forecasts of the standard
theory. This research area is known as Psychology and Economics (or Behavioral Economics).
The evidence suggests deviations from the standard theory in each step of the decision-making
process: 1) non-standard preferences, 2) incorrect beliefs, and 3) systematic biases in decision-
making. For each of these three steps, I present an example of the laboratory evidence,
introduce a simple model if available, and summarize the strength and weaknesses of the ﬁeld
evidence. Since the focus of the paper is on the ﬁeld evidence, I do not survey the laboratory
evidence or the theoretical literature.
To ﬁx ideas, consider the following stylized version of the standard model, modiﬁed from
Rabin (2002a). Individual i at time t = 0 maximizes expected utility subject to a probability














The utility function U (x|s)i sd e ﬁned over the payoﬀ xt
i of player i and future utility is dis-
counted with a (time-consistent) discount factor δ.
The ﬁrst class of deviations from the standard model in (1) is non-standard preferences,
discussed in Section 2. I focus on three dimensions: time preferences, risk preferences, and
social preferences. With respect to time preferences, the ﬁndings on self-control problems, for
example in retirement savings, challenge the assumption of a time-consistent discount factor δ.
With respect to risk preferences, the evidence such as on insurance decisions suggests that the
utility function U (xi|s) depends on a reference point r: the utility function becomes U (xi|r,s).
With respect to social preferences, the evidence, for example on charitable giving, suggests that
the utility function depends also on the payoﬀ of other people x−i: the utility is U (xi,x −i|s).
The research on non-standard preferences constitutes the bulk of the empirical research in
Psychology and Economics.
The second class of deviations from the standard model in (1) is non-standard beliefs
˜ p(s) 6= p(s), reviewed in Section 3. Systematic overconﬁdence about own ability can help
explain managerial behavior of CEOs. Non-Bayesian forecasting rationalizes ‘gambler’s fallacy’
behavior in lotteries and overinference from past stock returns. The overprojection of current
tastes on future tastes can explain aspects of the purchase of seasonal items.
The third class of deviations from the standard model is non-standard decision-making,
discussed in Section 4. For given utility U (x|s)a n db e l i e f sp(s), individuals resort to heuristics
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) instead of solving the complex maximization problem (1).
They simplify a complex decision by being inattentive to less salient features of a problem,
from asset allocation to purchase decisions. They use sub-optimal heuristics when choosing
from a menu of options Xi, such as for savings plans or loan terms. They are also subject
to social pressure and persuasion, for example in their workplace performance and in voting
decisions. Finally, they are aﬀected by emotions, as in the case of investment decisions.
While I organize the deviations in three separate classes, the three types of deviations are
often related. For example, persuasion leads to a diﬀerent decision through the change in
beliefs that it induces.
Are these deviations large enough to matter for our theories of how markets and institutions
work? A key test for Psychology and Economics is whether it helps to understand markets and
institutions. In Section 5, I provide evidence on how rational actors respond to these behavioral
anomalies. In particular, I discuss the response of ﬁrms, employers, managers, investors, and
politicians. These agents appear to have changed their own behavior in ways that would be
puzzling given the standard theory but that are consistent with utility-maximizing responses
2to the documented behavioral anomalies.
Following the summary of the evidence, in Section 6 I discuss the pros and cons of the ﬁve
types of evidence used in Psychology and Economics: (i) Menu Choice; (ii) Natural Experi-
ments; (iii) Field Experiments; (iv) Correlational Studies; and (v) Structural Identiﬁcation.
Given this evidence, I expect that the documented deviations from the standard model will
be increasingly incorporated in economic models. Indeed, features such as time inconsistency
and reference dependence have become common assumptions. In the concluding Section, I
present ﬁnal remarks on why these deviations matter also in the ﬁeld and discuss directions
for future research in Psychology and Economics.
This overview diﬀers from other surveys of Psychology and Economics (Rabin, 1998; Rabin,
2002a; Mullainathan and Thaler, 2001; Camerer, 2005) because it focuses on empirical research
using non-laboratory data. A number of caveats are in order. First, this paper, being organized
by psychological principles, does not provide an overview by ﬁeld of application; the interested
reader can consult as a starting point the book chapters in Diamond and Vartiainen (2007).
Second, the emphasis of the paper is on (relatively) detailed summaries of a small number of
papers for each deviation. As such, the survey provides a selective coverage of the ﬁeld evidence,
though it strives to cover all the important deviations.1 Finally, this overview undersamples
empirical studies in Marketing and provides a partial coverage of the research in Behavioral
Finance, probably the most developed application of Psychology and Economics, for which a
comprehensive survey of the empirical ﬁndings is available (Barberis and Thaler, 2004).
2 Non-standard Preferences
2.1 Self-Control Problems
The standard model (1) assumes a discount factor δ between any two time periods that is
independent of when the utility is evaluated. This assumption implies time consistency, that
is, the decision maker has the same preferences about future plans at diﬀerent points in time.2
Laboratory Experiments. Experiments on intertemporal choice, summarized in Loewen-
stein and Prelec (1992) and Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002), have cast doubt
on this assumption. This evidence suggests that discounting is steeper in the immediate future
than in the further future. For example, the median subject in Thaler (1981) is indiﬀerent be-
tween $15 now and $20 in one month (for an annual discount rate of 345 percent) and between
1This overview does not discuss deviations from the standard model that are widely documented in experi-
ments but not in the ﬁeld, such as will-power exhaustion and the availability heuristics.
2Strictly speaking, the standard model merely assumes time consistency, not a constant discount factor δ.
Still, most of the evidence in this Section–the adoption of costly commitments or behavior that diﬀers from
the plans–directly violates time consistency and hence also this more general version of the standard model.
3$15 now and $100 in ten years (for an annual discount rate of 19 percent).3 The preference
for immediate gratiﬁcation captured in these studies appears to have identiﬁable neural un-
derpinnings. Intertemporal decisions involving payoﬀs in the present activate diﬀerent neural
systems than decisions involving only payoﬀs in future periods (McClure et al., 2004).
Intertemporal preferences with these features capture self-control problems.W h e n e v a l u -
ating outcomes in the distant future, individuals are patient and make plans to exercise, stop
smoking, and look for a better job. As the future gets near, the discounting gets steep, and
the individuals engage in binge eating, light another (last) cigarette, and stay put on their job.
Preferences with these features therefore induce time inconsistency.
Model. Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) formalized these preferences
using (β,δ)p r e f e r e n c e s 4, building on Strotz (1956), Phelps and Pollak (1968), and Akerlof
(1991). Labelling as ut the per-period utility, the overall utility at time t, Ut, is
Ut = ut + βδut+1 + βδ2ut+2 + βδ3ut+3 + ...
The only diﬀerence from the standard model (with δ as the discount factor) is the parameter
β ≤ 1, capturing the self-control problems. For β<1, the discounting between the present
and the future is higher than between any future time periods, capturing the main ﬁnding of
the experiments. For β = 1, this reduces to the standard model.
A second key element in this model is the modelling of expectations about future time
preferences. O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) allow the agent to be partially naive (that is,
overconﬁdent) about the future self-control problems. A partially naive (β,δ) agent expects in
the future period t + s to have the utility function
ˆ Ut+s = ut+s + ˆ βδut+s+1 + ˆ βδ2ut+s+2 + ˆ βδ3ut+s+3 + ...
with ˆ β ≥ β. The agent may be sophisticated about the self-control problem (ˆ β = β), fully naive
(ˆ β = 1), or somewhere in between. This model, therefore, combines self-control problems with
a form of overconﬁdence, naivet´ e about future self-control.
Other models have been proposed to capture self-control problems, including axiomatic
models that emphasize preferences over choice sets (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001) and models
of the conﬂict between two systems, a planner and a doer (Shefrin and Thaler, 1981 and
3The laboratory experiments on time preferences face at least three issues: (i) most experiments are over
hypothetical choices, including Thaler (1981); (ii) in the experiments with real payments, issues of credibility
regarding the future payments can induce seeming present bias; (iii) the discounting should apply to consumption
units, rather than to money (in theory, over monetary outcomes, only the interest rate should matter). While
none of the experiments fully addresses all three issues, the consistency of the evidence suggests that the
phenomenon is genuine.
4These preferences are also labelled quasi-hyperbolic preferences, to distinguish them from (pure) hyperbolic
preferences, and present-biased preferences.
4Fudenberg and Levine, 2006, among others). For lack of space, and since most applied work
has referred to the (β,δ) model, we refer only to this latter model in what follows.
As an example of how the (β,δ) model operates, consider a good with immediate payoﬀ
(relative to a comparison activity) b1 at t = 1 and delayed payoﬀ b2 at t =2 . An investment
good, like exercising or searching for a job, has the features b1 < 0a n db2 > 0: the good
requires eﬀort at present and delivers happiness tomorrow. Conversely, a leisure good, like
consumption of tempting food or watching TV, has the features b1 > 0a n db2 < 0: it provides
an immediate reward, at a future cost.
How often does the agent want to consume, from an ex ante perspective? If the agent could
set consumption one period in advance, at t =0 , she would consume if βδb1 + βδ2b2 ≥ 0, or
b1 + δb2 ≥ 0. (2)
(Notice that β cancels out, since all payoﬀs are in the future)
How much does the agent actually consume at t = 1? The agent consumes if
b1 + βδb2 ≥ 0. (3)
Compared to the desired, optimal consumption, therefore, a (β,δ) agent consumes too little
investment good (b2 > 0) and too much leisure good (b2 < 0). This is the self-control problem
in action. In response, a sophisticated agent looks for commitment devices to increase the
consumption of investment goods and to reduce the consumption of leisure goods.
Finally, how much does the agent expect to consume? The agent expects to consume in the
future if
b1 + ˆ βδb2 ≥ 0, (4)
with ˆ β ≥ β. Compared to the actual consumption in (3), the agent overestimates the con-
sumption of the investment good (b2 > 0) and underestimates the consumption of the leisure
good (b2 < 0). Naivet´ e therefore leads to mispredictions of future usage.
I now present evidence on the consumption of investment goods (exercise and homeworks)
and leisure goods (credit card take-up and life-cycle savings) that can be interpreted in light
of this simple model.
Exercise. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) use data from three US health clubs oﬀering
a choice between a monthly contract XM with lump-sum fee L of approximately $80 per
month and no payment per visit, and a pay-per-visit contract Xp with fee p of $10. Denote by
E (xM)|XM the expected number of monthly visits under the monthly contract XM. Under the
standard model, individuals choosing the monthly contract must believe that pE (xM)|XM ≥ L,
or L/E (xM)|XM ≤ p: the price per expected attendances under the monthly contract should
be lower than the fee under payment-per-usage. Otherwise, the individual should have chosen
the pay-per-usage treatment. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), however, ﬁnd that health
5club users that choose the monthly contract XM attend only 4.8 times per month. These users
pay $17 per visit even though they could pay $10 per visit, a puzzle for the standard model.
A model with partially naive (β,δ) members suggests two explanations for this ﬁnding. The
users may be purchasing a commitment device to exercise more: the monthly membership
reduces the marginal cost of a visit from $10 to $0, and helps to align actual attendance in (3)
with desired attendance in (2). Alternatively, these agents may be overestimating their future
health club attendance, as in (4). Direct survey evidence on expectation of attendance and
evidence on contract renewal are most consistent with the latter interpretation.5
Homeworks and Deadlines. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) present evidence on home-
work completion and deadlines. The subjects are 51 professionals enrolled in a section of a
semester-long executive education class at Sloan (MIT), with three homeworks as a require-
ment. At the beginning of the semester, they set binding deadlines (with a cost of lower grades
for delay) for each of the homeworks. According to the standard model, they should set dead-
lines for the last day of the semester: there is no beneﬁt to setting early deadlines, since the
students do not receive feedback on the homeworks, and there is a cost of lower ﬂexibility.
(A maximization without constraints is always preferable to one with constraints.) According
to a model of self-control, instead, the deadlines provide a useful commitment device. Since
homework completion is an investment good (b2 > 0), individuals spend less time on it than
they wish to ex ante (compare equations (2) and (3)). A deadline forces the future self to
spend more time on the assignment. The results support the self-control model: 68 percent of
the deadlines are set for weeks prior to the last week, indicating a demand for commitment.6
This result leaves open two issues. First, do the self-set deadlines improve performance
relative to a setting with no deadlines? Second, is the deadline setting optimal? If the in-
dividuals are partially naive about the self-control, they will under-estimate the demand for
commitment (equation (4)). In a second (laboratory) experiment, Ariely and Wertenbroch
(2002) address both issues. Sixty students complete three proofreading assignments within 21
days. The control group can turn in each assignment at any time within the 21 days, a ﬁrst
treatment group can choose three deadlines (as in the class-room setting described above), and
a second treatment group faces equal-spaced deadlines. The ﬁr s tr e s u l ti st h a ts e l f - s e td e a d -
lines indeed improve performance: the ﬁrst treatment group does signiﬁcantly better than the
control group, detecting 50 percent more errors (on average, 105 versus 70) and earning sub-
stantially more as a result (on average, $13 versus $5). The second result is that the deadline
setting is not optimal: the group with equal-spaced deadlines does signiﬁcantly better than
the other groups, on average detecting 130 errors and earning $20. This provides evidence of
5In Section 5, I discuss how the contracts oﬀered by health club companies are consistent with the assumption
of naive (β,δ) consumers (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004).
6Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) also compare the performance in this section to the performance in another
section with equal-spaced deadlines, with results similar to the ones described below. However, the students are
not randomly assigned to the two sections.
6partial naivet´ e about the self-control problems.
Credit Card Take-up. Ausubel (1999) provides evidence on credit card usage using a
large-scale ﬁeld experiment run by a credit card company. The company mailed randomized
credit card oﬀers, varying both the pre-teaser and the post-teaser interest rates. For example,
compared to an oﬀer of 6.9% interest rate for six months and 16% thereafter (the control
group), the treatment group ‘Pre’ received a lower pre-teaser rate (4.9% followed by 16%); the
treatment group ‘Post’, instead, received a lower post-teaser rate (6.9% followed by 14%). For
each oﬀer, Ausubel (1999) observes the response rate and 21 months of history of borrowing
for the individuals that take the card. Across these oﬀers, the average balance borrowed in
the ﬁrst 6 months is about $2,000, while the average balance in the subsequent 15 months is
about $1,000.7 Given these borrowing rates, the standard theory predicts that the increase in
response rate for treatment ‘Post’ (relative to the control group) should be at least as large
as for treatment ‘Pre’: neglecting compounded interest, 15/12 ∗ 2% ∗ $1000 is larger than
6/12 ∗ 2% ∗ $2,000 (the comparison would only be more favorable for the ‘Post’ treatment if
we could observe the balances past 21 months). Instead, the increase in take-up rate for the
‘Pre’ treatment (386 people out of 100,000) is 2.5 times larger than the increase for the ‘Post’
treatment (154 people out of 100,000). Individuals over-respond to the pre-teaser interest
rate. Ausubel’s interpretation of this result is that individuals (naively) believe that they will
not borrow much on a credit card, past the teaser period. These ﬁndings are consistent with
underestimation of future consumption for leisure goods, as in (4).
Life-Cycle Savings. The (β,δ) model of self-control can also help explain puzzling fea-
tures of life-cycle accumulation, historically the ﬁrst application of these models. Building on
Laibson (1997) and Angeletos et al. (2001), Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2006) estimate a
fully-speciﬁed model of life-cycle accumulation with liquid and illiquid saving. They show that
the (β,δ) model can reconcile two facts: high credit card borrowing (11.7 percent of annual
income) and substantial illiquid wealth accumulation (216 percent of annual income for the
median consumer of age 50-59).8 Standard models have a hard time explaining both facts,
since credit card borrowing implies high impatience, which is at odds with substantial wealth
accumulation. The model with self-control problems predicts high spending on liquid assets,
but also a high demand for illiquid assets, which work as commitment devices.
Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2005) document directly the demand for illiquid savings as a
commitment device, and its eﬀect. They oﬀer an account with a commitment device to 842
randomly determined households in the Philippines with a pre-existent bank account. Access
to funds in these accounts is constrained to reaching a self-speciﬁed savings goal or a self-
7Of course, the diﬀerences in interest rates will aﬀect the borrowing directly, through incentive and selection
eﬀects. However, these diﬀerences are small enough in the data that we can, to a ﬁrst approximation, neglect
them in these calculations.
8The ﬁgures (from Laibson et al., 2006) refer to high-school graduates.
7speciﬁed time period. A control group of 466 households from the same sample is oﬀered a
verbal encouragement to save but with no commitment. The results reveal a sizeable demand
for commitment, and an impact of commitment on savings. In the treatment group, 202 of 842
households take up the commitment savings product. In this group, savings in the bank after
six months are 5.6 percentage points more likely to increase, compared to the control group that
received a pure encouragement.9 The diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. The comparison
includes individuals in the treatment group that do not take up the commitment savings
product; the treatment-on-the-treated estimate is larger by a factor of 842/202. Benartzi
and Thaler (2004), described in Section 5 below, provide evidence of substantial demand for
commitment devices in retirement savings in the US.
Default Eﬀects in 401(k)s. The evidence on default eﬀects is the ﬁnal set of ﬁnd-
ings bearing on self-control problems.10 Madrian and Shea (2001) consider the eﬀect on the
contribution rates in 401(k)s of a change in default. Before the change, the default is non-
participation in retirement savings; after the change, the default is participation at a 3% rate
in a money market fund. In both cases, employees can override the default with a phone call
or by ﬁling a form; also, in both cases, contributions receive a 50 percent match up to 6%
of compensation. Madrian and Shea (2001) ﬁnd that the change in default has a very large
impact: one year after joining the company, the participation rate in 401(k)s is 86% for the
treatment group and 49% for the control group.
Choi et al. (2004) show that these ﬁndings generalize to six companies in diﬀerent industries
with remarkably similar eﬀect sizes. This ﬁnding is not limited to retirement choices in the
U.S.. Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) examine the choice of retirement funds in Sweden after the
privatization of social security in the year 2000. They ﬁnd that 43.3 percent of new participants
choose the default plan, despite the fact that the government encouraged individual choice,
and despite the availability of 456 plans. Three years later, after the end of the advertisement
campaign encouraging individual choice, the proportion choosing the default plan increased to
91.6 percent. Overall, the ﬁnding of large default eﬀects is one of the most robust results in
the applied economics literature of the last ten years.11
What explains the large default eﬀect for retirement savings? Transaction costs alone are
unlikely to explain default eﬀects. Employees can change their retirement decisions at any
time using the phone or a written form. Such small transaction costs are dwarfed by the tax
advantages of 401(k) investments, particularly in light of the 50 percent match (up to 6% of
compensation) in place at the Madrian and Shea (2001) company. At a mean compensation of
about $40,000, the match provides a yearly beneﬁt of $1,200, assuming a discount rate equal
9These ﬁgures refer to the total bank balance across all accounts for a household, that is, they are not due
to switches of savings from an ordinary account to the account with commitment device.
10Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) is an early paper documenting default eﬀects.
11Default eﬀects matter in other decisions, such as contractual choice in health-clubs (DellaVigna and Mal-
mendier, 2006), organ donation (Abadie and Gay, 2006), and car insurance plan choice (Johnson et al, 1993).
8to the interest rate. It is hard to imagine transaction costs of this size.
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b and 2001) show that naive (β,δ)a g e n t sc a nd i s p l a yal a r g e
default eﬀect even with small transaction costs.12 Consider a naive (β,δ) agent that has to
decide when to undertake a decision with immediate disutility from transaction costs b1 < 0
and delayed beneﬁt b2 > 0, such as enrolling in retirement savings. This agent would rather
postpone this activity, given the self-control problems, as in equation (3). Moreover, this agent
is (incorrectly) convinced that if she does not do the activity today, she’ll do it tomorrow, as in
(4). This agent postpones the activity day-after-day, ending up never doing it. O’Donoghue and
Rabin (2001) show that, in the presence of naivet´ e, even a small degree of self-control problems
can generate (inﬁnite) procrastination. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b) presents calibrations
for the case of retirement savings in a deterministic set-up. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006)
allow for stochastic transaction costs and show that naive (β,δ) agents accumulate substantial
delays in a costly activity (in their case, cancelling a health club membership). O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2001) also show that, unlike naive agents, sophisticated (β,δ) agents do not ex-
hibit large default eﬀects for reasonable parameter values. While these agents would like to
postpone activities with immediate costs, they realize that doing an activity now is better than
postponing it for a long time.
If procrastination of a ﬁnancial transaction is indeed responsible for the default eﬀects in
Madrian and Shea (2001) and in Choi et al. (2004), we should expect that, if individuals were
forced to make an active choice at enrollment, they would display their true preferences for
savings. In this case, they bear the transaction cost whether they invest or not, and hence
investing does not have an immediate cost, i.e., b1 = 0. In this situation, the short-run self
does not desire to postpone the choice. Choi et al. (2005) analyze a company that required
its employees to choose the retirement savings at enrollment. Under this Active Decision
plan, 80% of workers enrolled in a 401(k) within one year of joining the company. Later, this
company switched to a no-investment default, and the one-year enrollment rate declined to
50%. Requiring workers to choose, therefore, produces an enrollment rate that is only slightly
lower than under the automatic enrollment in Madrian and Shea (2001).13
Welfare. These studies have welfare and policy implications. They suggest that savings
rates for retirement in the US may be low due to a combination of procrastination and defaults
s e tt on os a v i n g s . T h e( β,δ) model implies that the individuals are likely to be happier
with defaults set to higher savings rates. A change in policy with defaults set to automatic
enrollment is an example of cautious paternalism (Camerer et al., 2003), in that it would help
substantially individuals with self-control problems and inﬂict little or no harm on individuals
without self-control problems. These individuals can switch to a diﬀerent savings rate for a
12Inattention and limited memory about 401(k) inv e s t m e n ta r eo t h e rp o s s i b l ee x p l a n a t i o n s .
13The eﬀe c to ft h eA c t i v eD e c i s i o nm a ya l s ob ed u et oad e a d l i n ee ﬀect for naive (β,δ) employees, who know
that the next occasion to enroll will not be until several months later.
9low transaction cost. In Section 5, we present the results of a plan with automatic enrollment
and other features designed to increase savings (Benartzi and Thaler, 2004). An alternative
design could be based on the requirement to make an active choice, as in Choi et al. (2005).
Social Security is a commitment device to save, albeit one that consumers cannot opt out of,
and that thus can hurt consumers with no self-control problems.
Summary. A model of self-control problems with partial naivet´ e can rationalize a number
of ﬁndings that are puzzling to the standard exponential model: (i) excessive preference for
membership contracts in health clubs; (ii) positive eﬀect of deadlines on homework grades and
preference for deadlines; (iii) near-neglect of post-teaser interest rates in credit-card take-up;
(iv) liquid debt and illiquid saving in life-cycle accumulation; (v) demand for illiquid savings
as commitment devices; (vi) default eﬀects in retirement savings and in other settings.
The partially-naive (β,δ) model, therefore, does a good job of explaining qualitative pat-
terns across a variety of settings involving self-control. A frontier of this research agenda is to
establish whether one model can ﬁt these diﬀerent facts not just qualitatively, but also quan-
titatively. A few papers have estimated values for the time preference parameters. Laibson,
Repetto, and Tobacman (2006) estimate annual time preference parameters (β = .70,δ= .96)
on life-cycle accumulation data. Paserman (forthcoming), building on DellaVigna and Paser-
man (2005), uses job search data to estimate14 (β = .40,δ = .99) for low-wage workers and
(β = .89,δ= .99) for high-wage workers. Both papers assume sophistication.
2.2 Reference Dependence
The simplest version of the standard model as in (1) assumes that individuals maximize a
global utility function over lifetime consumption U (x|s).
Laboratory Experiments. A set of experiments on attitude toward risk call into question
the assumption of a global utility function. An example (using hypothetical questions) from
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) illustrates the point. A group of 70 subjects is asked to consider
the situation: “In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 1,000. You are now asked
to choose between A: (1,000, .50), and B: (500).” A diﬀerent group of 68 subjects is asked to
consider: “In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 2,000. You are now asked to
choose between C: (-1,000, .50), and D: (-500).” The allocations A and C are identical, and so
are B and D. However, in the ﬁrst group only 16 percent of the subjects choose A, in contrast
with 69 percent of subjects choosing C in the second group. Clearly, framing matters.
Choices in lotteries with real payoﬀs display similar violation of the standard theory. In
Fehr and Goette (2007), 27 out of 42 subjects prefer 0 Swiss Franks for sure to the lottery
(-5,p = .5; 8,p = .5). Under the standard model, this implies an unreasonably high level of
14In Paserman (2006), the model is estimated at the weekly level, so the β parameter refers to the one-week
discounting. The δ parameter is the annualized equivalent.
10risk aversion (Rabin, 2000). A subject that made this choice for all wealth levels would also
reject the lottery (-31,p = .5; ∞,p = .5), which oﬀers an inﬁnite payout with probability .5.
Model. Kahneman and Tversky (1979), in the second most cited article in economics
since 1970 (Kim, Morse, and Zingales, 2006), propose a reference-dependent model of util-
ity that, unlike the standard model, can ﬁt most of the experimental evidence on lottery
choice. According to prospect theory, subjects evaluate a lottery (y,p;z,1 − p)a sf o l l o w s :
π(p)v(y − r)+π (1 − p)v(z − r). Prospect theory is characterized by: (i) Reference Depen-
dence. The value function v is deﬁned over diﬀerences from a reference point r, instead of over
the overall wealth; (ii) Loss Aversion. The value function v(x)h a sak i n ka tt h er e f e r e n c e
point and is steeper for losses (x<0) than for gains (x>0); (iii) Diminishing Sensitivity. The
value function v is concave over gains and convex over losses; (iv) Probability weighting. The
decision-maker transforms the probabilities with a probability-weighting function π(p)t h a t
overweights small probabilities and underweights large probabilities.
The four features of prospect theory are designed to capture the evidence on risk-taking,
including risk-aversion over gains, risk-seeking over losses, and contemporaneous preference for
insurance and gambling. It can also capture framing eﬀects as in the example above. Lottery
A is evaluated as π(.5)v(1,000) and hence, given the concavity of v(x)f o rp o s i t i v ex and
given π(.5) ≈ .5, is inferior to lottery B, valued v(500). Conversely, lottery C is evaluated as
π(.5)v(−1,000) and, given the convexity of v(x)f o rn e g a t i v ex, is preferred to lottery D.
The large majority of the follow-up literature, however, adopts a simpliﬁed version of
prospect theory incorporating only features (i) and (ii). The subjects maximize
P
i piv(xi|r),
where v(x|r)i sd e ﬁned as
v(x|r)=
(
x − r if x ≥ r;
λ(x − r)i f x<r ,
(5)
where λ>1 denotes the loss aversion parameter. Prospect theory, even in the simpliﬁed
version of expression (5), can explain the aversion to small risk exhibited experimentally. A
prospect-theoretic subject evaluates the lottery (-5,.5; 8,.5) as .5λ ∗ (−5) + .5 ∗ 8=4− 2.5λ.
This subject prefers the status-quo for λ>8/5. (The experimental evidence from Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) suggests λ ≈ 2.25). I present a number of applications to economic
phenomena, including ones not involving risk (such as the endowment eﬀect and labor supply).
Endowment Eﬀect. A ﬁnding consistent with prospect theory and inconsistent with the
standard model is the so-called endowment eﬀect, an asymmetry in willingness to pay (WTP)
and willingness to accept (WTA). In the laboratory, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990)
randomly allocate mugs to one group of experimental subjects. They then use an incentive-
compatible procedure to elicit the WTA for subjects that received the mug, and the WTP for
subjects that were not allocated the mug. According to the standard theory, the two valuations
should on average be the same. The median WTA of $5.75, however, is twice as large as the
median WTP of $2.25. Since theoretically wealth eﬀects could explain this discrepancy, in a
11diﬀerent experiment Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler introduce choosers, alongside buyers and
sellers. Choosers, who are not endowed with a mug, choose between a mug and a sum of money;
the experimenters elicit the price that induces indiﬀerence. Their choice is formally identical
to the choice of the sellers (except for the fact that the choosers are not endowed with the
mug); hence, according to the standard theory, the sum of money that makes them indiﬀerent
should correspond to the WTA of sellers. Instead, in this experiment the median WTA for
sellers is $7.12, while the price for choosers is $3.12 (and the WTP for buyers is $2.87). The
asymmetry between WTA and WTP has implications such as low volume of trades in markets
and inconsistencies in the elicitation of contingent valuations in environmental decisions.
The endowment eﬀect is predicted by a reference-dependent utility function with loss-
aversion λ>1, as long as the subjects do not exhibit loss aversion with respect to money.
Assume that the utility of the subjects is u(1) if they received a mug, and u(0) otherwise,
with u(1) >u(0). Consider subjects with a piece-wise linear utility function (5), where the
reference point r depends on whether the subjects were assigned a mug. Subjects with the mug
have reference point r = 1 and assign utility u(1) − u(1) = 0 to keeping the mug and utility
λ[u(0) − u(1)] + pWTA to selling the mug for the sum pWTA. Subjects without the mug have
reference point r = 0 and assign value u(1) − u(0) − pWTP to getting the mug at price pWTP
and utility u(0) − u(0) = 0 to keeping the status-quo. The prices that make both groups of
subjects indiﬀerent between having and not having the mug are
pWTA = λ[u(1) − u(0)] and pWTP = u(1) − u(0),
hence pWTA = λpWTP. A loss-aversion parameter λ =5 .75/2.25 ﬁts the evidence in Kahneman
et al. (1990). Notice that choosers choose a mug if u(1) − u(0) ≥ pC, and hence pC = pWTP
with referent-dependent preferences, approximately as observed.
Plott and Zeiler (2004) criticize this set of experiments on the ground that the endowment
eﬀect may be due to lack of experience of subjects. They elicit the WTP and WTA for a mug
after extensive training and practice rounds, in 2 of 3 sessions including 14 rounds of trading of
lotteries (for which no endowment eﬀect is expected). In contrast to Kahneman et al. (1990),
they ﬁnd no evidence of the endowment eﬀect for mugs, with a median WTA of $5.00 and
a median WTP of $6.00. This result suggests that the endowment eﬀect does not appear in
economic settings where subjects are highly experienced and where they get repeated feedback.
Of course, several important economic decisions, such as buying or selling a house, involve only
limited experience and feedback.
List (2003 and 2004) provide ﬁeld evidence consistent with this hypothesis for participants
of a sports card fair. By selection, these subjects have at least some experience with sport
cards, but some subjects are substantially more experienced than others. List (2003) randomly
assigns sports memorabilia A or B as compensation for ﬁlling out a questionnaire. After the
questionnaire is ﬁlled out, the participants are asked whether they would like to switch their
12assigned memorabilia for the other one. Since the objects are chosen to be of comparable
value, the standard model predicts trade about 50 percent of the time. Instead, subjects
with low trading experience switch only 6.8 percent of the time, displaying a strong form
of the endowment eﬀect. Unlike inexperienced subjects, instead, subjects with high trading
experience switch 46.7 percent of the time, displaying no endowment eﬀect. The diﬀerence
between the two groups is not due to the fact that inexperienced traders are approximately
indiﬀerent between the two memorabilia, and hence willing to stick to the status quo. In
another treatment eliciting WTA and WTP, the WTA is substantially larger than the WTP
for inexperienced subjects (18.53 versus 3.32), but not for experienced subjects (8.15 versus
6.27). Next, List (2003) attempts to test whether the diﬀerence between the two groups is due
to self-selection of subjects without the endowment eﬀect among the frequent traders, or is a
causal eﬀect of trading experience on the endowment eﬀe c t . I naf o l l o w - u ps t u d yp e r f o r m e d
months later, the endowment eﬀect decreases in the trading experience accumulated in the
intervening months, supporting the latter interpretation. Finally, and most surprisingly, List
(2004) shows that the more experienced card traders also display substantially less endowment
eﬀect with respect to other goods, such as chocolates and mugs.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the endowment eﬀect is a feature of trading behavior
that market experience tempers.15 This evidence leaves open (at least) two interpretations.
One interpretation is that experience with the market leads individuals to become aware of their
loss aversion, and counteract it: experience mitigates loss aversion. Another interpretation is
that experience does not aﬀect loss aversion, but it impacts the reference-point formation.
Assume that experienced traders expect to trade the object that they are assigned with prob-
ability .5, independent of which group they are assigned to. As in K¨ oszegi and Rabin (2006),
we model subjects as having a stochastic reference point, r = 1 with probability .5 and r =0
otherwise. For individuals assigned the good, the (expected) value of keeping the good is
.5∗[u(1) − u(0)]+.5[u(1) − u(1)] = .5[u(1) − u(0)]; the (expected) value of selling the good
.5 ∗ [u(0) − u(0) + pWTA]+.5[λ(u(0) − u(1)) + pWTA]=.5[λ(u(0) − u(1))] + pWTA. This
implies pWTA = .5(1+λ)[u(1) − u(0)]. It is easy to show with similar calculation that
pWTP = .5(1+λ)[u(1) − u(0)] = pWTA.
If experienced subjects have rational expectations about their reference point (K¨ oszegi and
Rabin, 2006), they exhibit no endowment eﬀect, even if they are loss-averse. The follow-up
literature should consider carefully the determination of the reference point.
Labor Supply. As a second application, we consider the response of labor supply to
wage ﬂuctuations. This response, in general, reﬂects a complex combination of income and
substitution eﬀects (Card, 1994). Here, we consider a simple case in which income eﬀects can,
to a ﬁrst approximation, be neglected. I consider jobs in which workers decide the labor supply
15In the Conclusion, I discuss further the role of experience.
13daily, and in which the realization of the daily wage is idiosyncratic. Taxi drivers, for example,
decide every day whether to drive for the whole shift or end earlier; the eﬀective wage varies
from day-to-day as the result of demand shifters such as weather and conventions. For these
occupations, the income eﬀect from (uncorrelated) changes in the daily wage is negligible, and
we can neglect it by assuming a quasi-linear model. Assume that, each day, workers maximize
the utility function U (Y ) − θh2/2, where the daily earning Y equals hw, h is the number of
hours worked, w is the daily wage, and θh2/2 is the (convex) cost of eﬀort.
Following the simpliﬁed prospect theory formulation in (5), we assume that the utility
function U (Y )e q u a l s( Y − r)f o rY ≥ r, and λ(Y − r) otherwise, where r is a target daily
earning. Reference-dependent workers (λ>1) are loss-averse with respect to missing the daily
target earning. For λ = 1, this model reduces to the standard model with risk-neutral workers.
In the standard model (λ = 1), workers maximize wh− θh2/2, yielding an upward-sloping
labor supply curve h∗ = w/θ. As the wage increases, so do the hours supplied, in accordance
to the substitution eﬀect between leisure and consumption. A reference-dependent worker
(λ>1), instead, exhibits a non-monotonic labor supply function (Figure 1a). For a low wage
(w<
p
rθ/λ), the worker has not yet achieved the target earnings, and an increase in wage
leads to an increase in hours worked (h∗ = λw/θ), as in the standard model. For a high wage
(w>
√
rθ), the worker earns more than the target, and the labor supply is similarly upward-
sloping, albeit ﬂatter (h∗ = w/θ). For intermediate levels of the wage (
p
rθ/λ < w <
√
rθ),
instead, the worker is content to earn exactly the daily target r. Any additional dollar earned
makes it easier to reach the target and leads to reductions in the number of hours worked
(h∗ = r/w); this generates a locally downward-sloping labor supply function.
Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, and Thaler (1997) use three data sets of hours worked and
daily earnings for New York cab drivers to test whether the labor supply function is upward-
sloping, as the standard theory above implies, or downward-sloping. Denote by Yi,t and hi,t
14the daily earnings and the hours worked on day t by driver i. Camerer et al. (1997) estimate
the OLS labor-supply equation
log(hi,t)=α + β log(Yi,t/hi,t)+ΓXi,t + εi,t. (6)
Increases in the daily wage, computed as Yi,t/hi,t, lead to decreases in the number of hours
worked hi,t with elasticities ˆ β = −.186 (s.e. .129), −.618 (s.e. .051) and −.355 (s.e. .051). The
authors conclude that the data reject the standard model which predicts a positive elasticity,
and support a reference-dependent model with daily earnings as the reference point. As Figure
1a shows, though, the labor supply function is not necessarily downward-sloping for target
earners, and it is almost certainly not log-linear, unlike in speciﬁcation (6). Nevertheless, the
ﬁnding of a negative elasticity is consistent with reference-dependent preferences for shifts in
labor demand corresponding to a wage in the interval
p
θr/λ < w <
√
θr.
Speciﬁcation (6) is open to two main criticisms. First, a negative elasticity ˆ β is expected if
the daily ﬂuctuations in wages for cab drivers are due to shifters of labor supply (like rain that
make driving less pleasant), rather than shifters of labor demand. As Figure 1b illustrates, if
labor supply shifts across days, the resulting equilibrium points plot out a downward-sloping
curve even if the labor supply function is upward-sloping. Camerer et al. (1997) use interviews
of cab drivers to argue that the factors aﬀecting the wage are unlikely to change the marginal
cost of driving; however, in the absence of an instrument for labor supply, this objection is
a concern. Second, speciﬁcation (6) suﬀers from division bias, which biases downward the
estimate of β. Since the daily wage is computed as the ratio of daily earnings and hours
worked, and since hours worked is the left-hand-side variable in (6), any measurement error in
hi,t induces a mechanical downward bias in ˆ β. Camerer et al. (1997) address this objection by
instrumenting the daily wage of worker i by the summary statistics of the daily wage of the
other workers on the same shift. The estimates of β are still negative, though noisier.
15Farber (2005) uses a diﬀerent data set of 584 trip sheets for 21 New York cab drivers and
estimates a hazard model that does not suﬀer from division bias. For any trip t within a
day, Farber (2005) estimates the probability of stopping as a function of the number of hours
worked hi,t and the daily cumulative earnings to that point, Yi,t:
Stopi,t = Φ(α + βY Yi,t + βhhi,t + ΓXi,t),
where Φ is the c.d.f. of a standardized normal distribution. The standard theory predicts
that βY should be zero (since earnings are not highly correlated within a day), while reference
dependence predicts that βY should be positive. Farber (2005) ﬁnds that βY is positive (ˆ βY =
.015), but not signiﬁcantly so. While the author cannot reject the standard model, the point
estimates are not negligible: a ten percent increase in Yi,t (about $15) is predicted to increase
the probability of stopping by 15∗.015 = .225 percentage points, a 1.6 percent increase relative
to the average of 14 percentage points. This corresponds to an elasticity between earnings and
stopping of .16. These ﬁndings do not contradict prospect theory, since Farber (2005) does not
test the hypothesis that cab drivers have reference-dependent preferences (Failing to reject the
null is diﬀerent from rejecting the alternative hypothesis of prospect theory, especially in light
of the positive point estimates). In a more recent paper, Farber (2006) addresses this issue
and tests, using the same data set, a simple model of labor supply which explicitly allows for
reference-dependent preferences with a stochastic reference point. The ﬁndings provide weak
evidence of reference dependence: the estimated model implies a loss-aversion coeﬃcient λ
signiﬁcantly larger than zero. At the same time, however, the estimated variation across days
in the reference daily earning is large enough that reference dependence loses predictive power.
Given the lack of an instrument for daily wage ﬂuctuations, the evidence on the labor supply
of taxi drivers is unlikely to settle the debate on reference dependence and labor supply. Fehr
16and Goette (2007) provide new evidence using a ﬁeld experiment on the labor supply of bike
messengers. Like taxi drivers, bike messengers choose how long to work within a shift. Fehr
and Goette (2007) randomly assign 44 messengers into two groups. Each group receives a 25
percent higher commission for the deliveries for just one month in two diﬀerent months. This
design solves both problems discussed above, since the increase in wage is exogenous, and the
wage and the actual deliveries are exactly measured.
Fehr and Goette show that bike messengers in the treatment group respond in two ways to
the exogenous (and anticipated) temporary increase in wage: (i) they work 30 percent more
shifts; (ii) within each shift, they do 6 percent fewer deliveries. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is consistent
with both the standard model and the reference-dependent model. (When deciding on which
day to work, reference-dependent workers will sign up for shifts on days in which it is easier to
reach the daily target.) The second ﬁnding is consistent with target earning, and not with the
standard model, which predicts an increase in the number of hours worked within each shift.
However, this second ﬁnding, while statistically signiﬁcant, is quantitatively small, suggesting
the need for further evidence. In addition, this ﬁnding is consistent with an extension of the
standard model in which workers in the treatment group get more tired, and hence do fewer
deliveries, because they work more shifts.
With a clever design twist, Fehr and Goette (2007) provide additional evidence in support
of reference-dependence using laboratory tests of risk-taking. The bike messengers that display
loss aversion in the lab–i.e., they reject a (-5,.5;8,.5) lottery–exhibit a more negative response
(though not signiﬁcantly so) in their deliveries to the wage increase. The correlation between
the laboratory and the ﬁeld evidence of loss-aversion lends more credence to the reference-
dependence interpretation. Still, the debate on reference dependence and labor supply is open.
Finance. Two of the most important applications of reference-dependent preferences are
to the ﬁeld of ﬁnance.16 The ﬁrst application is to the equity premium puzzle: equity returns
outperformed bond returns by on average 3.9 percentage points during the period 1871-1993
(Campbell and Cochrane, 1999), a premium too large to be reconciled with the standard
model, except for extremely high risk aversion (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Benartzi and
Thaler (1995) use a calibration17 to show that this is the premium that loss-averse investors
would require to invest in stocks, provided that they evaluate their portfolio performance
annually. At horizons as short as a year, the likelihood that stocks underperform relative to
bonds requires a substantial compensation in terms of returns, given loss aversion. In a paper
that carefully formalizes the idea of Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Barberis, Huang, and Santos
(2001) show that reference-dependent preferences can match the observed equity premium.
This paper uses the simpliﬁed prospect-theory model with piece-wise linear function as in (5),
relying on reference dependence and loss aversion for the predictions.
16Barberis and Thaler (2003) present a more comprehensive survey of these applications.
17The calibration uses the loss-aversion parameter estimated from the experiments.
17The second application is to the so-called disposition eﬀect, which denotes the tendency
to sell ‘winners’ and hold on to ‘losers’18. Odean (1998) documents this phenomenon using
individual trading data from a discount brokerage house during the period 1987-1993. Deﬁning
gains and losses relative to the purchase price of a share, Odean computes the share of realized
gains PGR = (Realized Gains)/(Realized Gains + Paper Gains) to equal .148. The share of
realized losses PLR= (Realized Losses)/(Realized Losses + Paper Losses) equals .098. Odean
(1998) shows that the large diﬀerence between the propensity to realize gains (PGR)a n dt h e
propensity to realize losses (PLR) is not due to portfolio rebalancing, or to ex-post higher
returns for ‘losers’ (if anything, ‘winners’ outperform ‘losers’), or to transaction costs. The
disposition eﬀect is puzzling for the standard theory, since capital gain taxation would lead to
expect that investors liquidate ‘losers’ sooner. This puzzle is a robust ﬁnding, replicated more
recently by Ivkovich, Poterba, and Weisbenner (2005), who show that the eﬀect is present in
both taxable and tax-deferred accounts (though larger in tax-deferred accounts).
Prospect theory is viewed as a possible explanation for this phenomenon. The concavity
over gains induces less risk-taking for ‘winner’ stocks, and hence more sales of ‘winners’. The
convexity over losses induces more risk-taking for ‘loser’ stocks, and hence more purchases
of ‘losers’. Barberis and Xiong (2006), however, point out that this argument does not take
into account the impact of the kink at the reference point. When they simulate a calibrated
model of reference-dependent preferences, Barberis and Xiong (2006) ﬁnd that they obtain the
disposition eﬀect only for certain ranges of the parameters, and they obtain the opposite pattern
for other ranges. More research is necessary to say whether reference-dependent preferences
are a plausible explanation for the disposition eﬀect.
Insurance. A puzzling feature of insurance behavior is the pervasiveness of small-scale
insurance. Insurance policies on, for example, the telephone wiring are commonplace despite
the fact that, in case of an accident, the losses amount to at most $50 (Cicchetti and Dubin,
1994). This is a puzzle for expected utility, which implies local risk-neutrality and hence
no demand for small-scale insurance (except in the unrealistic case of fair pricing). Sydnor
(2006) provides evidence of excess small-scale insurance for the $36 billion home insurance
industry. Since mortgage companies require home insurance, the consumer choice is limited
to the level of deductible in a standard menu: $250 vs. $500 vs. $1000. Using a random
sample of 50,000 members of a major insurance company in one year, Sydnor documents that
83% of customers and 61% of new customers choose deductibles lower than $1000. The modal
homeowner chooses a $500 deductible, thereby paying on average $100 of additional premium
relative to a $1000 deductible. However, the claim rate is under 5%, which implies that the
value of a low deductible is about $25 in expectation. The standard homeowner, therefore, is
sacriﬁcing $100-$25=$75 in expectations to insure against, at worst, a $500-$100=$400 risk.
18In the housing market, Genesove and Mayer (2001) document that house-owners are less willing to sell
houses when housing prices are below the initial buying price, a phenomenon related to the disposition eﬀect.
18This indicates a strong preference for insuring against small risks that is a puzzle for the
standard theory, unless one assumes three-digit coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion. This de-
viation from the standard model involves substantial stakes. If, instead of choosing a low
deductible, homeowners selected the $1000 deductible from age 30 to age 65 and invested the
money in a money market fund, their wealth at retirement would be $6,000 higher. Sydnor
(2006) shows that a calibrated version of prospect-theory can match the ﬁndings by the over-
weighting of the small probability of an accident and the loss aversion with respect to future
losses19. The two components of prospect theory each account for about half of the observed
discrepancy between the predicted and the observed willingness to pay for low deductibles.
Social pressure by the salesmen (who are paid a percentage of the premium as commission)
may also contribute to the prevalence of low-deductible contracts.
Employment. Mas (2006) estimates the impact of reference points for the New Jersey
police. In the 9 percent of cases in which the police and the municipality do not reach an agree-
ment, the contract is determined by ﬁnal oﬀer arbitration. The police and the municipality
submit their oﬀers to the arbitrator, who has to choose one of the two oﬀers. In theory (Mas,
2006), if the disputing parties are equally risk-averse, the winner in arbitration is determined
by a coin toss.20 Mas (2006) exploits this prediction of quasi-random assignment to present
evidence on how police pay aﬀects performance for 383 arbitration cases from 1978 to 1995.
Mas documents that, in the cases in which the oﬀer of the employer is chosen, the share of
crimes solved by the police (the clearance rate) decreases by 12 percent compared to the cases
in which the police oﬀer is chosen. The author also documents a smaller increase in crime.
Lower than expected pay therefore induces the police to devote less eﬀort to ﬁghting crime.
Mas (2006) provides additional evidence that reference points mediate this eﬀect of pay
on performance. Mas uses the predicted award based on a set of observables as a proxy for
the reference point, and computes how the clearance rate responds to diﬀerences between the
award and the predicted award. The response is signiﬁcantly higher for cases in which the
police loses–and hence is on the loss side–than for cases in which the police wins–and hence
is on the gain side. This ﬁnding is consistent with reference-dependent preferences with loss
aversion. Assume for example that the utility function of the police is [V + v(w|r)]e − θe2/2,
where v(w|r) is as in (5). This assumes a complementarity between police pay w and eﬀort
e in the utility function, capturing a form of reference-dependent reciprocity. The ﬁrst-order
condition, then, implies e∗ (w)=[ V + v(w|r)]/θ. Given loss aversion in v(w|r), this predicts
indeed a stronger response for w below r than for w above r.
19Loss aversion could in principle go the other way, since individuals that are loss-averse to paying a high
premium may as well prefer the high deductible. Experimental evidence, however, suggests that consumers will
adjust their reference point on the premium side, since they are expecting to pay the premium for sure, but
cannot adjust the reference point on the future uncertain loss.
20In reality, the arbitrator rules for the municipality in 34.4 percent of cases, suggesting that the unions are
more risk-averse than the employers.
19Summary. Reference-dependent preferences help explain: (i) excessive aversion to small
risks in the laboratory; (ii) endowment eﬀect for inexperienced traders; (iii) (some evidence
of) target earnings in labor supply decisions; (iv) equity premium puzzle in asset returns;
(v) (possibly) the tendency to sell ‘winners’ rather than ‘losers’ in ﬁnancial markets; (vi) the
tendency to insure against small risks; (vii) eﬀort in the employment relationship. I have
discussed cases in which the evidence is more controversial (labor supply and endowment
eﬀect) and cases in which it is unclear whether reference-dependence is an explanation for the
phenomenon (disposition eﬀect). I have also discussed how the original model in Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) (and the calibrated version in Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) is rarely
applied in its entirety, often appealing just to reference dependence and loss-aversion.
A key issue in this literature is the determination of the reference point r. Often, diﬀerent
assumptions about the reference point are plausible, which makes the application of the theory
diﬃcult. K¨ oszegi and Rabin (2006) have proposed a solution. They suggest that the reference
point be modeled as the (stochastic) rational-expectations equilibrium of the transaction. In
any given situation, this model makes a prediction for the reference point, without the need
for additional parameters (though there can often be multiple equilibria, and hence multiple
possible reference points). This theory also provides a plausible explanation for some of the
puzzles in this literature. For example, as we discussed above, it predicts the absence of
endowment eﬀect among experienced traders (List, 2003 and Plott and Zeiler, 2004), even if
these traders are loss-averse. Experienced traders expect to trade any item they receive, and
hence their reference point is unaﬀected by the initial allocation of objects.
2.3 Social Preferences
The standard model, in its starkest form as in (1), assumes purely self-interested consumers,
that is, utility U (xi|s) depends only on own payoﬀ xi.
Laboratory Experiments. An extensive number of laboratory experiments calls into
question the assumption of pure self-interest. I present here the results of two classical ex-
periments, which we relate to the ﬁeld evidence below. (i) Dictator game. In this experiment
(Forsythe et al., 1994) a subject (the dictator) has an endowment of $10 and chooses how much
to transfer of the $10 to an anonymous partner. While the standard theory of self-interested
consumers predicts that the dictator would keep the whole endowment, Forsythe et al. (1994)
ﬁnd that sixty percent of subjects transfers a positive amount. (ii) Gift Exchange game. This
experiment (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993) is designed to mirror a labor market. It tests
eﬃciency wages models according to which the workers reciprocate a generous wage by work-
ing harder (Akerlof, 1982). The ﬁrst subject (the ﬁrm) decides a wage w ∈ {0,5,10,...}. After
observing w, the second subject (the worker) responds by choosing an eﬀort level e ∈ [.1,1].
The ﬁrm payoﬀ is (126 − w)e and the worker payoﬀ is w − 26 − c(e), with c(e)i n c r e a s i n g
20and slightly convex. The standard theory predicts that the worker, no matter what the ﬁrm
chooses, exerts the minimal eﬀort and that, in response, the ﬁrm oﬀers the lowest wage that
satisﬁes the participation constraint for the workers (w = 30). Fehr et al. (1993) instead ﬁnd
that the workers respond to a higher wage w by providing a higher eﬀort e. The ﬁrms, antic-
ipating this, oﬀer a wage above the market-clearing one (the average w is 72). These results
have been widely replicated and have given rise to a rich literature on social preferences in the
laboratory, summarized in Charness and Rabin (2002) and Fehr and G¨ achter (2000).
Model. Several models have been proposed to rationalize the behavior in these experi-
ments; we introduce a simpliﬁed version of the social preference model in Charness and Rabin
(2002), which builds on the formulation of Fehr and Schmidt (1999).21 In a two-player experi-




ρx2 +( 1− ρ)x1 when x1 ≥ x2;
σx2 +( 1− σ)x1 when x1 <x 2.
(7)
The standard model is a special case for ρ = σ =0 . The case of baseline altruism is ρ>0a n d
σ>0, that is, player 1 cares positively about player 2, whether 1 is ahead or not. In addition,
Charness-Rabin (2002) assume ρ>σ ,that is, player 1 cares more about player 2 when 1 is
ahead. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose an equivalent representation of preferences22 and
assume 0 <ρ<1, like Charness-Rabin (2002), but also σ<−ρ<0. When player 1 is behind,
therefore, she prefers to lower the payoﬀ of player 2 (since she is inequality-averse). These two
models can explain giving in a Dictator Game with a $10 endowment. The utility of giving
$5 is higher than the utility of giving $0 if 5 ≥ max((1 − ρ)10,σ10), that is, if ρ ≥ .5 ≥ σ
(altruism is high enough, but not so high that a player would transfer all the surplus to the
opponent.) Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that model (7) can also rationalize the average
behavior in the Gift Exchange game for high enough ρ: altruistic workers provide eﬀort to
lower the inequality with the ﬁrm; the ﬁrm, anticipating this, raises w.
Charitable Giving. The size of charitable giving is suggestive of social preferences in
the ﬁeld. In the US, in 2002, 240.9 billion dollars were donated to charities, representing an
approximate 2 percent share of GDP (Andreoni, 2006). Donations of time in the form of
volunteer work were also substantial: 44 percent of respondents to a survey reported giving
time to a charitable organization in the prior year, with volunteers averaging about 15 hours
21I nt h e s em o d e l s ,p l a y e r sc a r ea b o u tt h ei n e q u a l i t yo fo utcomes, but not about the intentions of the players
(though the general model in Charness and Rabin (2002) allows for it). Another class of models (including
Rabin, 1993 and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004), based on psychological games, instead assumes that
subjects care about the intentions that lead to speciﬁc outcomes. A common concept is reciprocity–subjects
are nice to subjects that are helpful to them, but not to subjects that take advantage of them. These models
also explain the laboratory ﬁndings.
22Fehr-Schmidt preferences take the form: U1(π1,π 2)=π1 −αmin(π2 − π1,0)−β min(π1 − π2,0)); they are
equivalent to the preferences in (7) for β = ρ and α = −σ.
21per month (Andreoni, 2006). Altogether, a substantial share of GDP reﬂects a concern for
others, a ﬁnding qualitatively consistent with the experimental ﬁndings. However, while social
preferences are a leading interpretation for giving, charitable donations may also be motivated
by other factors, such as desire for status and social pressure by the fund-raisers.
Even if we take it for granted that giving is an expression of social preferences, it is diﬃcult
to use models such as (7) to explain quantitatively the patterns of giving in the ﬁeld for
three reasons. (i) These models are designed to capture the interaction of two players, or
at most a small number of players. Charitable giving instead involves a large number of
potential recipients, from local schools to NGOs in Africa. (ii) The utility representation (7)
implicitly assumes that x1 and x2 include only the experimental payoﬀs from, say, the dictator
game. In the ﬁeld, it is diﬃcult to determine to what extent x1 and x2 should include, for
example, the disposable income. (iii) In one-to-one fund-raising situations, (hence side-stepping
issue (i)), models such as (7) over-predict giving. Suppose, for example, that x1 =$ 1 ,000 is
t h ed i s p o s a b l ei n c o m eo fp e r s o n1a n dx2 = $0 is the disposable income of person 2, for
example, a homeless person. For ρ ≥ .5 ≥ σ, the model predicts that person 1 should transfer
($1000 − $0)/2 = $500, a level of giving much higher than 2 percent of GDP. One has to make
ad-hoc assumptions on x1 to reproduce the observed level of giving. For these reasons, while
models of social preferences are very useful to understand behavior in the laboratory, they
are less directly applicable to the ﬁeld, compared to models of self-control and of reference-
dependence. Andreoni (2006) overviews models that better predict patterns of giving, such as
models of warm glow.
There are, however, ﬁeld settings which resemble more closely the laboratory set-up. When
a fund-raiser contacts a person directly, the situation resembles a dictator game, except for the
lack of anonymity. Field experiments in fund-raising, starting from List and Lucking-Reilly
(2002), estimate the eﬀect on giving of variables such as the seed money (the funds raised early
on), the match rate, and the identity of the solicitor. These experiments ﬁnd, for example, that
charitable giving is increasing in the seed money (List and Lucking-Reilly, 2002) presumably
because of signaling of quality of the charity. These results, however, do not address some of
the key questions on giving, such as why people give, and to whom they choose to give. These
questions are likely to be the focus of future research.
Workplace Relations. Workplace relations between employees and employer can be upset
at the time of contract renewal, and workers may respond by sabotaging production. Krueger
and Mas (2004) examine the impact of a three-year period of labor unrest at a unionized
Bridgestone-Firestone plant on the quality of the tires produced at the plant. The workers
went on strike in July 1994 and were replaced by replacement workers. The union workers were
gradually reintegrated in the plant in May 1995 after the union, running out of funds, accepted
the demands of the company. An agreement was not reached until December 1996. Krueger
and Mas (2004) ﬁnds that the tires produced in this plant in the 1994-1996 years were ten
22times more likely to be defective. The increase in defects does not appear due to lower quality
of the replacement workers. The number of defects is higher in the months preceding the strike
(early 1994) and in the period in which the union workers and the replacement workers work
side-by-side (and of 1995 and 1996). This indicates that negative reciprocity is response to
what workers perceive as unfair treatment can have a large impact on worker productivity.
Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005) test for the impact of social preferences in the work-
place among employees. They use personnel data from a fruit farm in the UK and measure
changes in the productivity as a function of changes in the compensation scheme. In the ﬁrst
8 weeks of the 2002 picking season, the fruit-pickers were compensated on a relative perfor-
mance scheme in which the per-fruit piece rate is decreasing in the average productivity. In
this system, workers that care about others have an incentive to keep the productivity low,
given that eﬀort is costly. In the next 8 weeks, the compensation scheme switched to a ﬂat
piece rate per fruit. The change was announced on the day of the switching. Bandiera et al.
(2005) ﬁnd that the, after the change to piece rate, the productivity of each worker increases
by 51.5 percent; the estimate holds after controlling for worker ﬁxed eﬀects and is higher for
workers with a larger network of friends. These results can be evidence for social preferences;
they can, however, also be evidence of collusion in a repeated game, especially since in the ﬁeld
each worker can monitor the productivity of the other workers. To test for these explanations,
the authors examine the eﬀect of the change in compensation for growers of a diﬀerent fruit
where the height of the plant makes monitoring among workers diﬃcult. For this other fruit,
the authors ﬁnd no impact on productivity of the switch to piece rate. This implies that the
ﬁndings are due to collusion, rather than to social preferences.
Gift Exchange in the Field. The Bandiera et al. (2005) paper underscores the impor-
tance of controlling for repeated game eﬀects in tests of social preferences. We now consider
as e to fﬁeld experiments that tests for Gift Exchange and carefully controls for these eﬀects.
Falk (forthcoming) examines the importance of gifts in fund-raising. The context is the mail-
ing of 9,846 solicitation letters in Switzerland to raise money for schools in Bangladesh. One
third of the recipients receives a postcard designed by the students of the school, another
third receives four such postcards, and the remaining third receives no postcards. The three
mailings are otherwise identical, except for the mention of the postcard as a gift in the two
treatment conditions. The donations are increasing in the size of the gifts. Compared to the
12.2 percent frequency of donation in the control group, the frequency is 14.4 percent in the
small gift and 20.6 percent in the large gift treatment. Conditional on a donation, the average
amount donated is slightly smaller in the large-gift treatment, but this eﬀect is small relative
to the eﬀect on the frequency of donors. The large treatment eﬀects do not appear to aﬀect
the donations at next year’s solicitation letter, when no gift is sent. A gift, therefore, appears
to trigger substantial positive reciprocity, as in the laboratory version of the Gift Exchange.
Gneezy and List (2006) test the gift exchange with two ﬁeld experiments in workplace
23settings. In the ﬁrst experiment, they hire 19 workers for a six-hour data entry task at a wage
of $12 per hour; in the second experiment, they hire 23 workers to do door-to-door fund-raising
for one weekend at a wage of $10 per hour. In both cases, they divide the workers into a control
and a treatment group. The control group is paid as promised, while the treatment group is
told after recruitment that the pay for the task was increased to $20 per hour. The authors
test whether the treatment group exerts more eﬀort than the control group, as predicted by the
gift exchange hypothesis, or the same eﬀort, as predicted by the standard model. The ﬁndings
are two-fold. At ﬁrst, the treatment group exerts substantially more eﬀort, consistent with
gift exchange: treated workers log 20 percent more books in the ﬁr s th o u ra n dr a i s e8 0p e r c e n t
more money in the morning hours. The diﬀerence however is short-lived: the performances
of control and treatment group are indistinguishable after two hours of data entry and after
three hours of fund-raising. In these two applications, the increase in wage does not pay for
itself (though it may for diﬀerent experimental designs). These experiments suggest that the
gift exchange may have an emotional component which dissipates over time.
Kube, Mar´ echal, and Puppe (2006) use a similar design for a six-hour library work in
Germany, but they add a negative gift exchange treatment. This group of subjects, upon
showing up, is notiﬁed that the pay is 10 Euro per hour, compared to the promised pay of
‘presumably’ 15 Euro per hour. (No one quits) This group logs 25 percent fewer books compared
to the control group, a diﬀerence that, unlike in the Gneezy and List (2006) paper, does not
d e c l i n eo v e rt i m e .T h eg r o u pi nt h ep o s i t i v eg i f te x c h a n g et r e a t m e n t( p a i d2 0E u r o )l o g so n l y
5 percent more books, an increase which also does not dissipate over time. The ﬁnding that
negative reciprocity is stronger than positive reciprocity is consistent with laboratory ﬁndings.
Finally, List (2006) presents evidence that not everyone reciprocates a generous transfer.
Attendees of a sports card fair participate in a ﬁeld experiment involving buying a card from
a dealer. One group is instructed to oﬀer $20 for a qood-quality card, while another group
is instructed to oﬀer $65 for a top-quality card. The quality of the card can be veriﬁed by
an expert but is not apparent on inspection. Dealers that are ‘non-local’ (and hence are not
concerned with reputation) oﬀer cards of the same average quality to the two groups, displaying
no gift-exchange behavior.23 These dealers, however, display gift-exchange-type behavior in
laboratory experiments designed to mirror the Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993) experiment.
These ﬁndings raise interesting questions on when gift-exchange behavior does and does not
arise. One explanation of the ﬁndings is that bargaining in a market setting is not construed as
a situation where norms of gift exchange apply. Hence, the dealers do not display such norms,
but they do instead in an experiment in which they play the role of subjects. More broadly,
this suggests that we need to understand the economic settings in which gift-exchange norms
apply (such as charitable giving and, to some extent, employment relationships) and the ones
23Dealers that are ‘local’, that is, that attend the fair frequently, oﬀer higher-quality card to the $65 group,
presumably because of reputation-building.
24where they do not apply (such as market bargaining).
Summary. Social preferences help explain: (i) giving to charities; (ii) the response of
striking workers to wage cuts; (iii) the response of giving to gifts in fund-raisers; (iv) the
response of eﬀort to unanticipated changes in pay, at least in the short-run. However, the
research on social preferences displays more imbalance between laboratory and ﬁeld, compared
to the research on self-control and on reference dependence. The models of social preferences
which match the laboratory ﬁndings are not easily applicable to the ﬁeld, overpredicting, for
example, the amount of giving. It will be important to see more papers linking the ﬁndings
in the laboratory, which allows the most control on the design, to the evidence in the ﬁeld;
the recent literature on Gift Exchange is a good example. A separate issue is the diﬃculty
of distinguishing in the ﬁeld social preferences from repeated game strategies (as in Bandiera
et al., 2005) and other alternative explanations. For example, social pressure (Section 4.3)
can explain regularities in giving, such as the higher eﬀectiveness of high-pressure fund-raising
methods (such as phone calls) relative to low-pressure ones (such as mailings). Creative ﬁeld
experiments such as those in this Section can be designed to distinguish diﬀerent explanations.
3 Non-standard Beliefs
The standard model in (1) assumes that consumers are on average correct about the distri-
bution of the states p(s). Experiments suggest instead that consumers have systematically
incorrect beliefs in at least three ways: (i) Overconﬁdence. Consumers over-estimate their
performance in tasks requiring ability, including the precision of their information; (ii) Law of
Small Numbers. Consumers expect small samples to exhibit large-sample statistical properties;
(iii) Projection Bias. Consumers project their current preferences onto future periods.
3.1 Overconﬁdence
Surveys and laboratory experiments present evidence of overconﬁdence about ability. In Sven-
son (1981), 93 percent of subjects rated their driving skill as above the median, compared to
the other subjects.24 Most individuals underestimate the probability of negative events such
as hospitalization (Weinstein, 1980) and the time needed to ﬁnish a project (Buehler, Griﬃn,
and Ross 1994). In Camerer and Lovallo (1999), subjects play multiple rounds of an entry
game in which only the top c out of n entrants make positive proﬁts. In the luck treatment
the top c subjects are determined by luck, while in the skill treatment the top c subjects are
determined by ability in solving a puzzle. More subjects enter in the skill treatment than in the
luck treatment, indicating that subjects overestimate their (relative) ability to solve puzzles.
24This ﬁnding admits alternative intepretations, such as that each individual may deﬁne driving ability in a
self-serving way. These interpretations, however, are addressed in the follow-up literature.
25The ﬁrst example of overconﬁdence in the ﬁeld is the naivet´ e about future self-control by
consumers, as documented in Section 2.1. (Self-control is an ability.)In a second example,
Malmendier and Tate (2005, forthcoming) provide evidence on overconﬁdence by CEOs about
their ability to manage a company. They assume that CEOs are likely to overestimate their
ability to pick successful projects and to run companies. As such, these top managers are
likely to invest in too many projects, and to over-pay for mergers. To test these hypotheses,
Malmendier and Tate identify a proxy for overconﬁdence, and examine the correlation of this
proxy with corporate behavior. In particular, they identify as overconﬁdent CEOs who hold
on to their stock options until expiration, despite the fact that most CEOs are heavily under-
diversiﬁed. They interpret the lack of exercise as overestimation of future performance of
their company. In Malmendier and Tate (forthcoming) they ﬁnd that these CEOs are 55
percent more likely to undertake a merger, and particularly so if they can ﬁnance the deal
with internal funds. (Overconﬁdent CEOs are averse to seeking external ﬁnancing, since they
deem it overpriced.) The correlation between option exercise and corporate behavior does not
appear to be due to insider information, since the CEOs that delay exercising stock options
do not gain money by doing so. Managerial overconﬁdence provides one explanation for the
underperformance of companies undertaking mergers. Malmendier and Tate (2005) use the
same proxies to show that overconﬁdence explains in part the excess sensitivity of corporate
investment to the availability of cash ﬂows, a long-standing puzzle in corporate ﬁnance.
A third example of overconﬁdence is the tendency to overestimate the precision of own
information, which is also a skill. For example, Alpert and Raiﬀa (1982) ask people to provide
answers with 98 percent conﬁdence intervals for a number of questions. These intervals contain
the correct answer only 60 percent of the time. Odean (1999) provides ﬁeld evidence using data
from a discount broker on all the trades of 10,000 individual investors for the years 1987-1993.
If the investors overestimate the precision of their information about individual companies,
they will trade too much. Indeed, the investors trade on average 1.3 times per year, with
a commission cost for buying or for selling a security of over 2 percent per transaction. In
addition to these substantial transaction costs, the individual investors pay a return cost to
trading, since the stocks sold over-perform the purchases by about 3 percent over the next
year. For individual investors, therefore, overconﬁdence has a substantial impact on returns.
Overconﬁdence about the precision of private information, coupled with self-attribution
bias, can also explain other anomalies in ﬁnancial markets, such as short-term positive corre-
lation of returns (momentum) and long-term negative correlation (long-term reversal) (Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998). Overconﬁdence induces individuals to trade exces-
sively in response to private information; in the long-run, the public information prevails and
the valuation returns to fundamentals, inducing a long-term reversal. The self-attribution bias
is responsible for momentum: in the short-term, as investors receive additional private infor-
mation, they interpret as more informative the information that conﬁrm to their beliefs, and
26h e n c eb e c o m ee v e nm o r eo v e r c o n ﬁdent. In Sections 3.2 and 4.1 we discuss how the law of small
numbers and limited attention provide alternative explanations for these phenomena.
Summary. Overconﬁdence helps explain: (i) patterns in credit card take-up and default
eﬀects, presented in Section 2.1 (overconﬁdence about self-control); (ii) value-destroying merg-
ers and investment-cash-ﬂow sensitivity (overconﬁdence about managerial ability); (iii) excess
trading, momentum, and long-term reversal (overconﬁdence about precision of information).
These applications are settings in which overconﬁdence is particularly likely according to the
laboratory evidence: overconﬁdence is more common when feedback is noisy (i.e., for stock
returns) and the decision-maker has an illusion of control (i.e., for managers).
3.2 Law of Small Numbers
Overconﬁdence is only one form of non-Bayesian beliefs detected in experiments. Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) describe a number of deviations from rational updating, including neglect of
base rate and overweighting of information that is available and representative. I focus on two
phenomena–‘gambler’s fallacy’ and overinference–captured by Rabin (2002b)’s model of the
law of small numbers. Rabin (2002b) assumes that subjects, observing a sequence of signals
drawn from an i.i.d. process, believe (incorrectly) that the signals are drawn from an urn of
size N<∞ without replacement. If the distribution of the signals is known, this induces
a ‘gambler’s fallacy’ belief: after a draw of a signal, subjects expect the next draw to be a
diﬀerent signal (since the draw is without replacement). For example, suppose that the return
to a mutual fund is drawn from an urn with 10 balls, 5 Up and 5 Down, with replacement. After
two draws of Up, a rational investor expects the probability of another Up to be .5. However,
a believer in the law of small number computes such probability as 3/8 <. 5, since two balls
‘Up’ have already been drawn. This is an example of the representativeness heuristics, in that
the sequence ‘Up, Up, Down’ is judged as more representative than the sequence ‘Up, Up, Up’.
Terrell (1994) provides ﬁeld evidence in New Jersey’s pick-three-numbers game. The lottery
is a pari-mutuel betting system: the fewer individuals bet on a number, the higher is the expect
payout. Terrell (1994) ﬁnds that the payout for a number that won one or two weeks before
is 33 percent higher than for an average number. Belief in ‘gambler’s fallacy’ leads lottery
players to bet less on numbers that won recently, at the cost of a lower expected payoﬀ.
The model in Rabin (2002b) delivers a second prediction. In the case of uncertain dis-
tribution of signals, the subjects overinfer from a sequence of signals of one type that the
next signal will be of the same type. While this appears to be the opposite of the ‘gambler’s
fallacy’, it is the complementary phenomenon. Consider a mutual fund with a manager of
uncertain ability. The return is drawn with replacement from an urn with 10 balls. With
probability .5 the fund is well managed (7 balls Up and 3 Down) and with probability .5
the fund is poorly managed (3 Up and 7 Down). After observing the sequence ‘Up, Up,
27Up’, a rational investor computes the probability that the mutual fund is well-managed as




.927. A Law-of-Small-Number investor also applies Bayes Rule but has the wrong model
for P (UUU|Well)a n dP (UUU|Poor). Hence, her forecasted probability for P (Well|UUU)
equals (7/10∗6/9∗5/8)/[(7/10∗6/9∗5/8)+(3/10∗2/9∗1/8)] ≈ .972. Hence, this investor over-
infers about the ability of the mutual-fund manager after three good performances. Assume
now that the Law-of-Small-Number investor believes that the urn is replenished after 3 peri-
ods. When forecasting the performance in the next period, the rational investor expects an Up
performance with probability .927∗.7+(1−.927)∗.3 ≈ .671, while the Law-of-Small-Number
investor expects Up with probability .972 ∗ .7+( 1− .972) ∗ .3 ≈ .689, which is higher.
Benartzi (2001) provides ﬁeld evidence of overinference (also called extrapolation): the de-
gree to which employees invest in employer stock depends strongly on the past performance
of the stock. In companies in the bottom quintile of performance in the past ten years, 10.4
percent of employee savings are allocated to employer stock, compared to 39.7 percent for
companies in the top quintile. This diﬀerence does not reﬂect information about future re-
turns. Companies with a higher fraction of employees investing in employer stock underperform
relative to companies with a lower fraction.
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) present an alternative model of the law of small
number and apply it to ﬁnancial markets. While the draws are i.i.d., investors believe that
the draws come from either a ‘mean-reverting’ regime or a ‘trending’ regime; in addition, the
investors believe that the ﬁrst regime is more likely ex ante. If investors observe a sequence of
identical signals, in the short-run they expect a mean-reverting regime (the gambler’s fallacy);
hence, the returns under-react to information, inducing short-term positive correlation (mo-
mentum). However, after a longer sequence, the individuals overinfer, as in Rabin (2002b),
and expect a ‘trending’ regime; this induces a long-term negative correlation of returns.
3.3 Projection Bias
A third way in which individuals have systematically incorrect beliefs is that they expect their
future preferences to be too close to the present ones; for example, they project current hunger
levels on the future. Read and van Leeuwen (1998) asked oﬃce workers to choose a healthy
snack or an unhealthy snack to be delivered a week later (in the late afternoon). Workers were
asked either when they were plausibly hungry (in the late afternoon) or when satiated (after
lunch). In the ﬁrst group, 78 percent chose an unhealthy snack, compared to 42 percent in
the second group. Similarly, individuals under-appreciate the extent to which they adapt to
future circumstances. (Gilbert et al., 1998).
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) propose a simple model of projection bias.
Assume that utility u is a function of consumption c and of a state variable s, that is, u =
28u(c,s). The current state is s0 and the future state is s. Then, when predicting the future
utility ˆ u(c,s), an individual with projection bias expects utility




rather than u(c,s). The parameter α ∈ [0,1] captures the extent of projection bias, with α =0
denoting the standard case and α = 1 the case of full projection bias. This model can capture
the mis-prediction of future hunger, as well as the under-appreciation of adaptation.
Conlin, O’Donoghue, and Vogelsang (forthcoming) present evidence of projection bias using
a data set of 2 million orders of cold-weather apparel items. They consider the eﬀect of weather
at the time of purchase on the probability that an item is returned, conditional on purchase.
According to the standard model, colder weather at the time of purchase should not aﬀect the
probability of a return, or may aﬀect it negatively (since colder weather at the time of purchase
is correlated with colder weather over the subsequent days). Projection bias, instead, makes
the opposite prediction. On colder days, individuals overestimate the use that they will make
of a cold-weather item, and hence are ex post more likely to return the item. This prediction
holds whether the projection bias regards future utility, as in (8) (‘I expect to like cold-weather
items very much’), or future weather (‘I expect the coming winter to be very cold’).
Conlin et al. (forthcoming) ﬁnd that a reduction in the order-date temperature of 30◦F–
corresponding to a decrease, for example, from 40◦Ft o1 0 ◦F– increases the average return rate
of a cold-weather item by 3.96 percent, consistent with projection bias. A simple structural
model of projection bias as in (8) implies estimates for ˆ α ≈ 0.5, implying that consumers
predict future tastes roughly half-way between present tastes and actual future tastes.
4 Non-standard Decision-Making
Even given utility U (x|s)a n db e l i e fp(s), individuals make non-standard decisions. We an-
alyze: (i) the neglect (or overweighting) of information because of limited attention; (ii) sub-
optimal heuristics used for choices out of menu sets; (iii) social pressure–explicit pressure by
others–and persuasion–excess impact of the beliefs of others; (iv) emotions.
4.1 Limited Attention
In the starkest form of the standard model, individuals make decisions using all the available
information. Since Simon (1955), economists have attempted to relax this strong assumption
and have proposed models in which individuals simplify complex decisions, for example by
processing only a subset of information25. In economic experiments, the simplifying heuristics
include thinking only one step ahead in dynamic problems (Gabaix et al., 2006).
25Conlisk (1996) provides an early survey of this literature. We discuss the model of inattention by Gabaix
and Laibson (2006) in Section 5.
29The laboratory studies in psychology indicate that attention is a limited resource. In studies
of dichotic listening (Broadbent, 1958), for example, subjects hear diﬀerent messages in the
right ear and in the left ear, and are instructed to attend to one of the messages. When asked
about the other message, they remember very little of it. Moreover, in treatments in which
they have to rehearse a sentence or a sequence of numbers while listening, their capacity to
attend to a message is substantially lower.
We model attention as a scarce resource. Consider a good whose value V (inclusive of price)
is determined by the sum of two components, a visible component v a n da no p a q u ec o m p o n e n t
o˙ : V = v + o. Due to inattention, the consumer perceives the value to be ˆ V = v +( 1− θ)o,
where θ denotes the degree of inattention, with θ = 0 as the standard case of full attention. The
interpretation of θ is that each individual sees the opaque information o, but then processes
it only partially, to the degree θ.26 The inattention parameter θ is itself a function of the
salience s ∈ [0,1] of o and of the number of competing stimuli N: θ = θ(s,N). Based on
the psychology evidence, I assume that the inattention θ is decreasing in the salience s and
increasing in the competing stimuli N: θ0
s < 0a n dθ0
N > 0. Inattention is zero for a fully
salient signal: θ(1,N) = 0. The consumer’s demand is D[ˆ V ], with D0[x] > 0 for all x.
This framework suggests, broadly speaking, three strategies to identify the inattention
parameter θ, which the papers describe below undertake. The ﬁr s ti st oc o m p u t eh o wt h e
valuation ˆ V responds to a change in o; the derivative ∂ ˆ V/ ∂o=( 1− θ) can be compared to
∂ ˆ V/ ∂v = 1 to test for limited attention. Hossain and Morgan (2006) and Chetty, Looney,
and Kroft (2007) in the section on alcohol taxes follow this avenue. The second is to examine
the response of consumer valuation to an increase in the salience s, ∂ ˆ V/ ∂s = −θ0
so, and
test whether it diﬀers from zero. This is the strategy of Chetty et al. (2007) in their ﬁeld
experiment. The third strategy is to vary the number of competing stimuli N, ∂ ˆ V/ ∂N= −θ0
No,
and test whether this has an eﬀect. This is the strategy of DellaVigna and Pollet (2006) and
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2007). All three of these strategies identify a piece of opaque
information o with regards to which the decision-makers are not fully attentive.
This research is subject to two caveats. The ﬁr s tc a v e a ti st h a tm e a s u r i n gt h es a l i e n c eo f
information involves a subjective judgment, similar to the judgment involved in setting the
reference point in prospect theory. While in most settings (such as the ones in this Section)
it is rather clear which features are visible and which are opaque, the psychology experiments
do not provide a general criterion. The second caveat is that we do not address whether
the inattention is rational or not. In general, models of limited attention can be rephrased
as rational model with information costs in which less salient information has higher costs
of acquisition. In most of the examples below, however, the opaque information is publicly
26An alternative model (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 2007) posits that θ is the probability that an individual
perceives the opaque signal, rather than the degree to which each individual incorporates the signal. This
alternative model leads to similar results but a more cumbersome solution for settings like an auction.
30available at a zero or small cost (for example, the information on earnings announcements),
making a rational interpretation of the ﬁndings less plausible.
Inattention to Shipping Costs. In eBay auctions, the price of an item is more vivid
than the shipping cost, because the shipping cost is not listed in the item title and also because
historically most purchases have not involved shipping. Deﬁne v as the value of the object and
o as the negative of the shipping cost: o = −c. Since eBay is (essentially) a second price auction,
the inattentive bidders bid their value net of the (perceived) shipping cost: b∗ = v − (1 − θ)c.
The revenue raised by the seller is b∗+c = v+θc. A $1 increase in the shipping cost c, therefore,
increases revenue by θ dollars. In the case of full attention (θ = 0), increases in the shipping
cost have no eﬀect on revenue. Hossain and Morgan (2006) examine these predictions with
a ﬁeld experiment. In the treatment cLO, they auction CDs with a $4 reserve price and no
shipping cost, while in treatment cHI they auction CDs with a $.01 reserve price and a $3.99
shipping cost. The change in reserve price guarantees that the two auction are equivalent for
a fully attentive bidder. The average revenue raised in treatment cHI is $1.79 higher ($10.16
vs. $8.37) than in treatment cLO, and is higher for 9 out of 10 CDs27. These estimates imply
substantial inattention: ˆ θ =1 .79/3.99 = .45. A second set of auctions with higher shipping
costs (cLO =$ 2a n dcHI = $6), leads to smaller increase of revenue in the high-shipping cost
condition ($12.87 vs. $12.15), corresponding to an inattention parameter ˆ θ =0 .72/4=.18.
Inattention to Non-Transparent Taxes. Chetty et al. (2007) study whether consumers
are inattentive to taxes that are not transparently factored in the price of a good, like indirect
state taxes. They use data on the demand for items in a grocery store. Assume that demand D
is a function of the visible part of the value v, including the price p, and of the less visible part
o, capturing the state tax −tp: D = D[v − (1 − θ)tp]. The change in log-demand ∆logD from
making the tax fully salient (s =1a n dh e n c eθ = 0) is (linearizing the demand) logD[v − tp]−
logD[v − (1 − θ)tp]=−θtp∗ D0 [v − (1 − θ)tp]/D[v − (1 − θ)tp]=−θt ∗ ηD,p, where ηD,p is
the price elasticity of demand. Notice that the response is zero for fully attentive investors
(θ = 0). This implies θ = −∆logD/(t∗ηD,p). Chetty et al. (2007) manipulate the salience of
taxes with a ﬁeld experiment. In a three-week period, the price tags of certain items indicate
the after-tax price, in addition to the pre-tax price. Compared to previous-week sales for the
same item, and compared to items for which tax was not made salient, the average quantity
sold decreases (signiﬁcantly) by 2.20 units relative to a baseline level of 25, an 8.8 percent
decline. Since the price elasticity ηD,p in this sample is estimated to be −1.59 and the tax is
7.375 percent, we can compute ˆ θ = −(−.088)/(−1.59∗.07375) ≈ .75. In a separate estimation
strategy, Chetty et al. (2007) identify the impact on beer consumption of changes across
States and over time in the excise and sales taxes. Since the excise tax is included in the price,
while the sales tax is added at the register, inattentive consumers should be more responsive
to changes in the excise tax than to changes in the sales tax. Indeed, the ﬁrst elasticity is
27We exclude CDs that do not sell from this computation; the diﬀerence would be $2.60 if they were included.
31substantially larger, leading to an estimate of the inattention parameter of ˆ θ = .94. Consumer
inattention to non-transparent taxes is substantial.
I n a t t e n t i o nt oC o m p l e xI n f o r m a t i o ni nR a n k i n g s .In other settings, the familiarity
of information depends on the simplicity of the data format. Pope (2007) studies the response of
consumers to rankings of hospitals and colleges by the US News and World Report.E a c hy e a r ,
the company constructs a continuous quality score from 0 to 100 largely based on reputation
scores, and then creates rankings based on this score. Both the scores and the rankings are
published in the yearly report. While the continuous score contains all the information, the
rankings are presumably easier to process (“No. 5 Hospital” vs. “Hospital with 89/100 score”).
Pope shows that, holding constant the quality score, hospital discharges respond signiﬁcantly
to diﬀerences in ranks among hospitals; similarly, college applications respond to diﬀerences
in ranks among colleges. Pope (2007) also provides a calibration of the inattention or thinking
costs necessary to justify this result.
Inattention to Financial News. Limited attention among investors induces under-
reaction to newly-released information and hence can explain anomalies such as momentum
(Hong and Stein, 1999). Huberman and Regev (2001) examines the case of the company
EntreMed, an interesting example of under-reaction to information. On November 28, 1997,
Nature prominently features an article reporting positive results on a cure for a type of cancer
for a drug patented by EntreMed. On the same day, the New York Times reports an article
on the same topic on page A28. Unsurprisingly, the stock price of EntreMed increases by 28
percent. What is surprising is what happens next. On May 4, 1998, the New York Times
publishes on the front page an article on EntreMed that is very similar to the article that it
had already published in November. Despite the fact that the article contains no new hard
information, it leads to a 330 percent one-day return for EntreMed, and to a 7.5 percent one-
day return for all bio-tech companies, moving billions in market capitalization. The stock price
of EntreMed does not revert to the previous level over the whole next year.
While this is just a case study, it stresses the importance of studying systematically the
response to new information. One important setting is the release of quarterly earnings news,
and the consequent response of asset prices. To simplify, assume that v is the known infor-
mation about cash-ﬂows of the company, and that o is the new information contained in the
earnings announcement. On the day before the announcement, the company price is P = v.
On the day of the announcement, the updated company value is v + o. However, since the
investors are inattentive, the asset price P responds only partially to the new information:
P = v +( 1− θ)o. Over time, as the information makes its way to the inattentive investors
(for example through additional articles as in the EntreMed case), the price incorporates the
full value v+o. This implies that the short-run stock return rSR equals rSR =( 1− θ)o/v;t h e
long-run stock return rLR, instead, equals rLR = o/v. In this example, a measure of investor
attention is (∂rSR/∂o)/(∂rLR/∂o)=( 1− θ). (The division by (∂rLR/∂o) is a re-normalization
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mediate response and the larger is the predictability of stock returns in the days following
the announcement, a phenomenon known as post-earnings announcement drift (Bernard and
Thomas, 1989). Inattention leads to delayed absorption of information.
While this setting is highly stylized, similar results obtain after allowing for uncertainty
and arbitrage, as long as arbitrage is limited by risk aversion and short investor horizons (for
example, DellaVigna and Pollet, 2006). DellaVigna and Pollet (2006) estimate the empirical
counterpart of (∂rSR/∂o)/(∂rLR/∂o) using the response of returns r to the earnings surprise
o. They measure returns in the 2 days surrounding an announcement (rSR)a n do v e rt h e7 5
trading days from an announcement (rLR). The immediate response captures 58 percent of
the overall response, implying substantial inattention: ˆ θ ≈ .42. If the delayed response is due
to attention deﬁcits, the delay should be even stronger when a higher share of investors are
distracted (higher θ). DellaVigna and Pollet (2006) use the weekend as a proxy of investor
distraction. For announcements made on Friday, indeed, the share of immediate response
(∂rSR/∂o)/(∂rLR/∂o)i s4 1p e r c e n t ,i m p l y i n gˆ θ ≈ .59, consistent with higher inattention before
the weekend. This provides an explanation for the observed release of worse earnings on Friday:
companies maximizing short-term value release worse news on low-attention days.
In a similar context, Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2007) analyze the impact of informational
overload (high N in the framework above). They ﬁnd that the incorporation of earnings
news into stock prices is 20 percent slower on days in which more announcements take place.
Increasing the amount of competing information accentuates the eﬀect of limited attention.
Another related study is Cohen and Frazzini (forthcoming), which analyzes how investors
respond to indirect, and hence less salient news (low s in the framework above). They con-
sider companies linked in the supplier-customer chain. When a customer company announces
substantial earnings news, the news aﬀects also the supplier, but this indirect eﬀect is less
likely to attract attention. Indeed, Cohen and Frazzini (forthcoming) show that suppliers of
companies which experience declining stock returns have lower stock returns 1 to 3 months
later. They measure the speed of the response of returns to news about the customer company
using (∂rSR/∂o)/(∂rLR/∂o), where rSR is the one-month return and rLR is a seven-month
return. They ﬁnd that for the customer company, 93 percent of the overall response occurs in
the initial month; for the supplier company, instead, only 60 percent of the overall response
occurs in the ﬁrst month, suggesting substantial inattention to indirect links.
A ﬁnal dimension of salience s is the temporal distance. Holding constant the informa-
tiveness, information that is further into the future (or past) is less likely to be salient. In
general, it is diﬃcult to control for informativeness, since information that is further away is
usually less relevant or less precisely estimated. DellaVigna and Pollet (forthcoming) address
this issue by considering future demand shifts due to demographics. Unlike other forecasters,
cohort size shifts are highly predictable even ten years into the future. For example, if a large
33cohort is born in 2006, school bus companies in 2012 are going to experience a forecastable
increase in demand and, if the market is not perfectly competitive, in proﬁts. If investors are
perfectly attentive, this increase will be incorporated into returns already in 2006 and stock
returns from 2006 to 2012 will not be predictable using demographic information. However,
if investors neglect information beyond 5 years into the future, the stock prices will increase
only in 2007, and stock returns from 2006 to 2012 will be predictable using public informa-
tion on demographics. Using data for 48 industries from 1939 to 2003, DellaVigna and Pollet
show that the growth rate in demand due to demographics 5 to 10 years ahead forecasts stock
returns in an industry positively. These results are consistent with inattention to information
further than approximately 5 years into the future.
Summary. Limited attention helps explain the (partial) neglect of: (i) shipping costs in
eBay auctions; (ii) non-transparent taxes; (iii) complex information in rankings; (iv) earnings
news, specially before weekends and on days with more competing news; (v) news about
linked companies; (vi) demand shifts in the distant future. As an example of application to
another ﬁeld, a literature on inattention in macroeconomics developed from the models of
sticky information of Mankiw and Reis (2002) and of rational inattention of Sims (2003).
4.2 Menu Eﬀects
In this Section, I consider choices out of a (and typically large) menu set, such as for investment
options or politicians on a ballot. The evidence in psychology suggests that individuals use
(at least) ﬁve sub-optimal heuristics to simplify these decisions: (i) Excess Diversiﬁcation (or
1/n Heuristic); (ii) Choice Avoidance; (iii) Preference for the Familiar; (iv) Preference for the
Salient; (v) Confusion in Implementing the Choices.
Excess Diversiﬁcation. Individuals facing a complex choice may simplify it by diversi-
fying excessively across the options. An example in psychology is Simonson (1990). In a ﬁrst
treatment (simultaneous condition), students in a class chose snacks to be consumed over the
next three class meetings, one per meeting. In a second treatment (sequential condition), the
subjects chose the snack sequentially on each of the three class meetings. In the simultane-
ous condition, the subjects display excess diversiﬁcation: 64 percent of subjects chose three
diﬀerent snacks, while in the sequential condition only 9 percent of subjects made this choice.
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) study whether excess diversiﬁcation applies to 401(k) invest-
ments. As a special case, they study the case of equal diversiﬁcation across the n available
options, the 1/n heuristics. They use aggregate data on the 1996 plan assets for 162 companies
which oﬀer an average of 6.8 plan options. Lacking individual-level data, they study an ag-
gregate implication of the 1/n heuristic. If individuals divide their investments approximately
equally across options, their exposure to equity will be increasing in the availability of equity
34options in the 401(k) plan. Across plans, Benartzi and Thaler estimate the relationship
%Invested In Equity =ˆ α + .36(.04) ∗ %Equity Options + ˆ BX (9)
(s.e. in parentheses), where the control variable X is the availability of employer stock in the
portfolio. In companies with an equity share that is 10 percentage points higher, the employees
invest 3.6 percent more in equity plans. This ﬁnding is consistent with a weak form of the
1/n heuristic (If the employees followed the 1/n heuristics strictly, the coeﬃcient should be 1
rather than .36). A confound is that the equity content of a plan may be designed to cater to
the preferences of the employees, resulting in reverse causation.
Huberman and Jiang (2006) investigate the investor diversiﬁcation using a data set on
the individual choice of employees in 647 401(k) plans managed by Vanguard. They estimate
speciﬁcation (9) at the individual level with a large set of individual-level and plan-level controls
X. They obtain the relationship %InvestedInEquity =ˆ α+.29(.06)∗%Equity Options+ ˆ BX
for funds with less than 10 options and %Invested In Equity = α + .06(.07) ∗ %Equity
Options + ˆ BX for funds with more than 10 options. The relationship predicted by the 1/n
heuristic, therefore, is present when the number of funds is small (as in the Benartzi and Thaler
sample), but not when the number of funds is large. Huberman and Jiang provide additional
evidence suggesting that the predictive power of the 1/n heuristic is low. In particular, the
number of funds chosen by employees hardly responds at all to the number of investment
options oﬀered in the plan. (This test diﬀers from the one above as it is not conditional
on equity vs. non-equity choices.) There is some evidence of a conditional 1/n heuristic:
conditional on the allocations chosen, individuals allocate their savings approximately equally.
37 percent of employees follow this behavior among employees investing in 4 funds, 26 percent
among employees investing in 5 funds, and 53 percent among employees investing in 10 funds;
the behavior is instead not common for non-round numbers. Overall, some employees use a
version of the 1/n heuristic when the number of investment options is small; when the number
is large, other heuristics, which I discuss next, are at play.
Choice Avoidance. Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang (2004) analyze the eﬀect of the num-
ber of investment options on the participation in 401(k) plans. They ﬁnd that the higher is
the number of options, the lower is the participation rate. On average, 75 percent of employees
participate in plans with only 2 funds available, but the participation rate falls to 65 percent
when employees choose between 40 or more funds. Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2006) provide
additional evidence that a smaller number of options increases 401(k) plan participation. Par-
ticipation in a 401(k) plan increases by 10 percentage points when non-participating employees
receive a card that allows them, if mailed back, to enroll in a default plan (3 percent contribu-
tion in a balanced fund).28 These ﬁndings are surprising in light of the standard theory–more
options should increase the likelihood that the marginal individual invests–and in light of an
28The increase may be due to a reminder eﬀect of the card. However, in other settings, reminders, and more
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The research in psychology provides a simple explanation: When the choice set is large,
individuals are less likely to make a choice. In a ﬁeld experiment, Iyengar and Lepper (2000)
compare the behavior of consumers in an upscale grocery store, where at some times consumers
were oﬀered the opportunity to taste 6 jams, while at other times the tasting included 24 jams.
They ﬁnd that in the 24-jam condition, more consumers stop to sample jams (145 versus 104
customers), but substantially fewer buy jams (4 versus 31 customers).
Bertrand et al. (2006) ﬁnds a similar result in a ﬁeld experiment on the mailing of 50,000
loan oﬀers in South Africa. The authors randomize, among other things, the format of the table
illustrating the use of the loan. The small-table format lists only one loan size as an example,
while the big-table format presents four diﬀerent loan sizes. The take-up in the small-table
format is .6 percentage points larger compared to a baseline of 8 percentage points, an eﬀect
size equivalent to a reduction of the (monthly) interest rate by 2.3 percentage points.
Preference for the Familiar. Ad i ﬀerent heuristic arising in the case of large menu sets
is the choice of a familiar option. This tendency is wide-spread among individual investors. In-
vestors in the USA, Japan, and the UK allocate 94%, 98%, and 82% of their equity investment,
respectively, to domestic equities (French and Poterba, 1991). While the preference for own-
country equity may be due to costs of investments in foreign assets, the same pattern appears
for within-country investment. Huberman (2001) documents the geographical distribution of
the shareholders of the Regional Bell companies. The fraction invested in the own-state Re-
gional Bell is 82 percent higher than the fraction invested in the next Regional Bell company.
The preference for the familiar occurs despite substantial costs of under-diversiﬁcation.
A particularly egregious case is the preference for own-company stock. On average, em-
ployees invest 20-30 percent of their discretionary funds in employer stocks (Benartzi, 2001),
despite the fact that the employees’ human capital is already invested in their company. This
choice does not reﬂect private information about future performance. Companies where a
higher proportion of employees invest in employer stock have lower subsequent one-year re-
turns, compared to companies with a lower proportion of employee investment.
The preference for familiar options is consistent with ambiguity aversion. As in the classical
Ellsberg (1961) paradox, investors that are ambiguity-averse may prefer an investment with
known distribution of returns to an investment with unknown distribution, even if the average
returns are the same for the two investments, and despite the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation.
Preference for the Salient. Barber and Odean (forthcoming) show that individual in-
vestors simplify complex portfolio decisions also by choosing a salient option. Using individual
generally ﬁnancial education, do not have such large eﬀects. For example, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2005)
sent a survey including 5 questions on the beneﬁts of employer match to 345 employees that were not taking
advantage of the match. A control group of 344 employees received the same survey except for the 5 speciﬁc
questions. The treatment had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the savings rate.
36trading data, they show that individual investors are net buyers of companies with unusually
h i g h ,o rl o w ,p e r f o r m a n c ei nt h ep r e v i o u sd a y , of companies with high trading volume, and
of companies in the news. The eﬀects are large: for companies in the highest or lowest decile
of the previous day’s returns, the Buy-Sell imbalance (Buy-Sell/(Buy+Sell)) for individual
investors is 20 percentage points higher than for companies in the ﬁfth decile. These results
suggest that individuals solve the informational overload problem of which stocks to buy by
picking companies that stand out. The same problem does not present itself for stock sales,
since most investors own only a small number of stocks at any given time.
T h ep r e f e r e n c ef o rt h es a l i e n tt a k e sd i ﬀerent forms in diﬀerent contexts. In the choice of
candidates on a ballot, the ﬁrst politician on the list stands out. Ho and Imai (2004) provides
evidence that order of the candidates matters even when the order is random. They exploit
the natural experiment induced by the California voting system which, since 1975, explicitly
randomizes the ballot order of candidates across Assembly Districts. They show that in the
1998 and 2000 general elections a minor party candidate experiences on average a 10 percent
increase in votes when ﬁrst on the list. The eﬀect is instead very small for candidates of
the major parties, suggesting that irrelevant information is used as a tie-breaker for cases in
which the decision-maker has less information. In primary elections, in which candidates are
on average less known, the eﬀect is stronger: the impact of being ﬁrst in the list is on average
a 20 percent increase, roughly 1.6 percent of the party vote.
Confusion. A ﬁnal category, confusion, diﬀers from the previous heuristics in that it does
not reﬂect a preference, whether to avoid diﬃcult choices or for salient options, but simply
an error in the implementation of the preferences. As such, it diﬀers from most behavioral
phenomena which reﬂect a directional bias. A ﬁrst setting is the choice of a political candidate
among those in a ballot. Shue and Luttmer (2007) consider California voters in the 2003 recall
elections and exploit the random variation in the placement of candidates on the ballot, simi-
larly to Ho and Imai (2004). They ﬁnd that the vote share of minor candidates is signiﬁcantly
higher for candidates whose name on the ballot is adjacent to the name of a major candidate.
While this phenomenon could be due to a spill-over in attention, confusion is a more likely
explanation: the eﬀect of horizontal adjacency (a name to the right or to the left of the major
candidate) is almost entirely due to adjacency on the confusing side. For example, in the se-
quence Bubble, Candidate A, Bubble, Schwarzenegger, Bubble, Candidate B, it is Candidate B
that beneﬁts from the presence of a major candidate, since some voters mistake its bubble for
the bubble of Schwarzenegger. Candidate A does not beneﬁt, nor do candidates located at a
diagonal adjacency. Further, the spill-over of votes is larger for more confusing voting methods
(such as punch-cards) and for precincts with a larger share of lower-education demographics,
that are more likely to make errors when faced with a large number of options. This method
allows for a measure of confusion. Across diﬀerent voting methods, about 3 in 1,000 voters
meaning to vote for a major candidate instead vote for a minor candidate. The phenomenon
37hence is small but not irrelevant. Importantly, it can have an aggregate eﬀect, since confusion
is likely to have a diﬀerent prevalence among the voters of diﬀerent major candidates.
Interestingly, Rashes (2001) identiﬁes a similar phenomenon in the choice of stocks. The
article focuses on an egregious case of potential confusion between two companies, MCI and
MCIC. The ticker for the MCI communication company is MCIC, while MCI is the ticker
for a little-known closed-end mutual fund, Massmutual Corporate Investors. Using days with
exceptional news regarding the MCIC company, the authors estimate a degree of confusion
comparable to the one in the voting data. Between 1 and 10 out of 1,000 investors attempting
to trade the MCIC company purchase instead shares of the closed-end mutual fund. Since this
latter company has a much smaller trading volume, the confusion has signiﬁcant eﬀects on its
trading and causes a signiﬁcant correlation in daily stock returns between the two companies.
Summary. When choosing from a large menu of options, decision-makers: (i) (to same
extent) diversify excessively across the options; (ii) avoid the choice and do not invest (or
do not purchase); (iii) choose familiar options, such as own-country or own-company stock;
(iv) choose salient options in investment choice or at the ballot; (v) display some confusion in
implementing their choices.
4.3 Persuasion and Social Pressure
Persuasion. In the standard model, individuals take into account the incentives of the in-
formation provider. The neglect of incentives can lead to excess impact of the beliefs of the
information provider, which I label persuasion. An example from psychology is Cain, Loewen-
stein, and Moore (2005). The subjects are paid for the precision of the estimates of the number
of coins in a jar. Since they see the jar only from a distance, they have to rely on the advice of
a second group of subjects, the advisors, that inspect the jar from close. The two experimental
treatments vary the incentives for the advisors. In a ﬁrst treatment, the advisors are paid for
how closely the subjects guess the number of coins; in a second treatment, the advisors are paid
for how high the subjects’ guess is. Despite the fact that the incentives are common-knowledge,
the estimate of the subjects is 28 percent higher in the second treatment. The subjects do not
discount enough for the conﬂi c to fi n c e n t i v e so ft h ea d v i s o r s .
In a ﬁnancial setting, Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) analyze how small and large
investors respond to recommendation by analysts. Analyst forecasts are notoriously biased
upward–94.5 percent of recommendations are Hold, Buy, or Strong Buy–, and aﬃliated
analysts are even more biased. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) show that large investors
take into account this bias, and discount the information: for example, they respond to a
Hold recommendation by selling the shares of a company, and they discount heavily positive
recommendations by aﬃliated analysts. Small investors, instead, are subject to persuasion.
They follow the recommendations literally–for example holding a stock in response to a Hold
38recommendation–and do not discount for the additional distortions due to analyst aﬃliation.
In a political setting, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) tests whether the information provided
by a news source convinces on average its audience. They exploit the geographical variation
in the introduction in the cable programming of the Fox News Channel, a more conservative
channel relative to the pre-existing news sources (CNN and the networks). Fox News avail-
ability in the town cable programming in 2000 appears to be largely idiosyncratic, conditional
on a set of controls. Using the voting data for 9,256 towns, they ﬁnd that the vote share for
Republicans in 2000 is half-a-percentage point higher in the towns oﬀering Fox News. They
estimate that Fox News convinced 5 to 30 percent of the audience that was not already Repub-
lican, depending on the audience measure. This impact can be a temporary eﬀect for Bayesian
voters that are learning about the bias of Fox News, or a persuasion eﬀect for non-rational
voters that do not take into account the political orientation of Fox News.
Social Pressure. A separate reason for excess impact of the beliefs of others is the
pressure to conform, or social pressure (Akerlof, 1991). Two classical laboratory experiments
illustrating the power of social pressure are Asch (1951) and Milgram (1963). In the Asch
(1951) experiment, the subjects are given two cards: the ﬁr s tc a r dh a sal i n eo ni t ,w h i l et h e
second card has three lines of substantially diﬀering length (one of the same length as in the
ﬁrst card). The subjects are asked which of the lines in the second card is closest in length to
the line in the ﬁrst card, after 4 to 8 subjects (who, unbeknownst to them, are confederates)
unanimously choose the wrong answer. On average, over a third of subjects give the wrong
answer to avoid disagreeing with the unanimous judgment of the other participants. In a
control group with no confederates, less than 2 percent of subjects give the wrong answer.
While this result could be interpreted as social learning, the learning is unlikely to be about
the length of the line, but possibly about the rules of the experiment. It should also be pointed
out that the subjects were not paid for accuracy.
In the Milgram (1963) experiment, a group of subjects is told that their task is to monitor
the learning of another subject (a confederate), and to inﬂict electric shocks on this subject
when he makes an error. Encouraged by the experimenter, 62 percent of the subjects escalate
the electric shocks up to a level of 450 Volts, despite hearing the subject scream in pain. This
proneness to obedience comes as a surprise to the subjects themselves. When a diﬀerent group
of 40 subjects is provided with a description of the experiment and asked to predict how far
subjects would go in inﬂicting shocks, no one predicts that 450 Volts would be reached.
In the ﬁeld, social pressure is hard to distinguish from rational diﬀusion of information.
In some studies, however, the social pressure motive is evident. Garicano, Palacios-Huerta,
and Prendergast (2005) measure the length of extra-time that referees assign at the end of a
game of soccer; in the extra-time the teams can score goals. They ﬁnd that referees on average
give twice as much extra time (4 minutes versus 2 minutes) when the extra time is bound to
advantage the local team (1 goal behind) than when it is bound to hurt it (1 goal ahead).
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pressure is larger (larger attendance at the game). Referees respond signiﬁcantly to pressure
by the local public, despite oﬃcial rules on what determines the length of extra-time.
Some of the peer eﬀect literature also points to the importance of social pressure. Falk and
Ichino (2006) measure the eﬀect of peer pressure on task performance. High-school students in
Switzerland were recruited to perform a one-time job for a ﬂat payment; they were instructed to
stuﬀ letters into envelopes for 4 hours. The control group of 8 students did the task individually,
while the treatment group of 16 students worked in pairs (but each student was instructed to
stuﬀ the envelopes individually). Students in the treatment group stuﬀed signiﬁcantly more
envelopes (221 vs. 190), and coordinated the eﬀort within group: the within-pair standard-
deviation of output is signiﬁcantly less than the (simulated) between-pairs standard deviation.
While the results of Falk and Ichino (2006) could also be due to social learning, Mas and
Moretti (2006) presenting direct evidence of social pressure. They ﬁnd that high-productivity
cashiers in a supermarket chain increase the productivity of co-workers that are present in the
same shift. The eﬀect is not due to exchange of information, such as on a price tag. The
positive peer eﬀect occurs only when the more productive co-worker is behind and therefore
can observe the other worker’s productivity. The eﬀect is quite large: a one percent increase
in the average permanent productivity of the workers behind increases the productivity of the
peer by .23 percent; the eﬀect is even larger for co-workers that are working at a closer distance.
There is no eﬀect of a highly-productive co-worker in front.
4.4 Emotions
Some of the previous phenomena, such as self-control problems, social preferences in giving,
and projection bias in food purchase are likely mediated (at least partially) by emotional
states, respectively temptation, empathy, and hunger. A large literature in psychology suggests
that emotions play an important role in decision-making, and that diﬀerent emotions operate
very diﬀerently (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). In this Section, I consider two examples of
emotions, mood and arousal, for which ﬁeld evidence is available.
In experiments, even minor mood manipulations have a substantial impact on behavior
and emotions. For example, on sunnier days, subjects tip more at restaurants (Rind, 1996)
and express higher levels of overall happiness (Schwarz and Clore, 1983). In the ﬁeld, mood
ﬂuctuations induced by the weather aﬀect stock returns, despite the fact that daily weather
ﬂuctuations are unlikely to aﬀect fundamentals. Days with higher cloud cover in New York are
associated with lower aggregate US stock returns (Saunders, 1993). Hirshleifer and Shumway
(2003) extend this analysis to 26 countries between 1982 and 1997 using the weather of the city
where the stock market is located. They ﬁnd a negative relationship between cloud cover (de-
trended from seasonal averages) and aggregate stock returns in 18 of the 26 cities. Days with
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ﬁve percent of a standard deviation. After controlling for cloud cover, other weather variables
such as rain and snow are unrelated to returns. If mood is the channel for these eﬀects, other
mood-altering events should have similar eﬀects. Indeed, international soccer matches impact
the daily stock returns for the losing country (Edmans, Garcia, and Norli, 2007). Compared to
a day with no match, a loss lowers daily returns (signiﬁcantly) by .21 percent. (Surprisingly, a
win has essentially no eﬀect). More important matches, such as World Cup elimination games,
have larger eﬀects. The eﬀect does not appear to depend on whether the loss was expected or
not. International matches in other sports have a consistent, though smaller, eﬀect.
The eﬀect of these mood-altering events on returns is likely due to (i) an impact on risk
aversion or perception of volatility, or (ii) a projection of the mood to economic fundamen-
tals. The evidence above does not allow to distinguish these two eﬀects. Mood induced by
atmospheric factors can also induce subtler changes in behavior. Simonsohn (2007) examines
the role of weather on the day of campus visit to a prestigious university. Students visiting
on days with more cloud cover are signiﬁcantly more likely to enroll. Simonsohn suggests that
higher cloud cover induces the students to focus more on academic attributes versus social
attributes of the school, a hypothesis supported by laboratory experiments.
A second set of laboratory experiments suggests that emotional arousal has an important
eﬀect on decisions. In one experiment, subjects that are sexually aroused as part of the
treatment report a substantially higher willingness to engage in behavior that may lead to
date rape (Ariely and Loewenstein, 2005). In other experiments, subjects exposed to violent
video clips are more likely to display more aggressive behavior, such as aggressive play during a
hockey game, compared to a control group watching non-violent clips (Josephson, 1987). The
impact is partly due to imitation and partly to arousal.
Dahl and DellaVigna (2007) provide ﬁeld evidence on the short-run impact of exposure to
media violence on violent crime. They exploit the time-series variation in movie violence at
the box oﬃce and compare days where the blockbuster movies are violent to days in which
the blockbuster movies are non-violent. They ﬁnd that on days in which exposure to media
violence is higher, violent crime is lower. This eﬀect is not only due to incapacitation because
the potential criminals are in the movie theater. In the night following the exposure (midnight
to 6AM), for every million people exposed to violent movies, violent crime is 1.5 percent lower.
The diﬀerence between the laboratory and the ﬁeld evidence is likely due to diﬀerences in
design. The laboratory experiments capture the impact of surprise exposure to violence, while
the ﬁeld evidence captures the impact when individuals self-select. Arousal does not induce as
much aggression in the short-run for the individuals who choose to watch violent media.
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In the previous Sections, I have documented how consumers deviate from the standard model
in their choices of credit cards, clothing items, eBay bidding strategies, giving, health clubs,
insurance contracts, and loans. I have discussed how workers make non-standard eﬀort, labor
supply, and retirement savings decisions. I have provided evidence of disposition eﬀect, inat-
tention, and overtrading among investors. Finally, I documented how voters are aﬀected by
irrelevant factors such as the order of politicians.
This evidence is just the ﬁrst step towards a better understanding of markets where agents
display non-standard preferences and beliefs. This evidence raises a natural question: how
do markets and institutions respond to these non-standard features? An important test for
Psychology and Economics is whether it helps to understand markets and institutions.
This Section discusses how rational actors respond to the non-standard features of other
agents. Proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms respond to the non-standard features of consumer behavior
in their contract design and pricing (Behavioral Industrial Organization). Employers tailor
their employment contracts to the non-standard behavior of the employees (Behavioral Labor
Economics). In response to the non-standard behavior of investors, rational investors alter
their trading strategies, and ﬁrm managers alter the capital structure (Behavioral Finance and
Behavioral Corporate Finance). Politicians change their behavior to respond to voter biases
(Behavioral Political Economy). Finally, policy-makers can use the ﬁndings in Psychology and
Economics to inform the design of institutions and of policy (Behavioral Institutional Design).
Before I proceed, I discuss an important caveat. If consumers have non-standard features,
why should one expect ﬁrms, employers, ﬁnancial operators, and politicians to not have them?
Experience is a key diﬀerence. Unlike individual consumers, ﬁrms can specialize, hire consul-
tants, and obtain feedback from large data sets and capital markets. Firms are also subject to
competition. Compared to consumers, therefore, ﬁrms are less likely to be aﬀected by biases
(except for principle-agent problems), and we expect them to be close to proﬁt maximization.
In addition, even if ﬁrms have non-standard features, they still have incentives to respond to
the non-standard features of consumers. Similar arguments apply for employers, institutional
investors, top managers, and politicians.
Behavioral Industrial Organization. The interaction between consumers with biases
and rational, proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms is the central theme of the growing literature in behavioral
industrial organization, surveyed in Ellison (2006). While this literature is mostly theoretical,
the papers surveyed here also make predictions about observed pricing.
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) consider the proﬁt-maximizing pricing with (β, ˆ β,δ)
consumers with self-control problems. A (monopolistic) ﬁrm sells a product which, as in
Section 2.1, has immediate payoﬀ b1 and delayed payoﬀ b2. The set-up covers investment
g o o d ss u c ha se x e r c i s e( b1 < 0a n db2 > 0) and leisure goods such as gambling (b1 > 0a n d
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marginal cost c and sells it using a two-part tariﬀ, with a lump-sum fee L and a unitary price
p. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) show that the proﬁt-maximizing price p∗ satisﬁes
p∗ − c = −
³
1 − ˆ β
´
δb2
f(ˆ βδb2 − p∗)
f (βδb2 − p∗)
−
F(ˆ βδb2 − p∗) − F (βδb2 − p∗)
f (βδb2 − p∗)
. (10)
For standard agents (β = ˆ β = 1), the two terms on the right-hand side of (10) are zero: the
ﬁrm prices at marginal cost, p∗ = c,to align the incentives of the consumers. For sophisticated
agents with self-control problems (β = ˆ β<1), only the ﬁrst term in (10) is non-zero: the ﬁrm
prices investment goods below marginal cost (p∗ <c ) and leisure goods above marginal cost
(p∗ >c ) to provide a commitment device–the pricing increases the consumption of investment
goods and lowers the consumption of leisure goods. The deviation from marginal cost pricing,
−(1 − β)δb2, is exactly the diﬀerence in how much the current self and the future selves value
the delayed payoﬀ b2; hence, the ﬁrm oﬀers a perfect commitment device. For fully naive agents
with self-control problems (β<ˆ β = 1), only the second term in (10) is non-zero: the ﬁrm again
prices investment goods below marginal cost and leisure goods above marginal cost again, but
for a diﬀerent reason–it takes advantage of consumer overestimation (underestimation) of the
consumption of investment (leisure) goods. The deviation from marginal cost pricing is indeed
a function of the mis-estimation of consumption F(ˆ βδb2 − p∗) − F (βδb2 − p∗). These results
generalize to the case of perfect competition, since competition only alters the equilibrium fee
L∗. This theory rationalizes the presence of contracts with no payment per visit in health
clubs (b2 > 0), the presence of high interest rates but no annual fees for credit cards (b2 < 0),
and cheap room rates and buﬀets for gamblers in Las Vegas (b2 < 0).
Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) generalize this analysis to allow for heterogeneity in naivet´ ea n d
a more general form of time-inconsistency of preferences. They show that ﬁrms oﬀer two
types of contracts: perfect commitment devices that cater to time-inconsistent agents that
are suﬃciently sophisticated, and contracts that take advantage of the consumers that are
suﬃciently naive. Interestingly, the fully sophisticated agents do not exert any informational
externality on the na¨ ıve types. Thus, the provision of the perfect commitment device does not
reduce the gains that the monopolist can extract from na¨ ıve types.
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) analyze the pricing with boundedly-rational consumers that do
not pay attention to hidden features of products, that they call add-ons. In equilibrium, ﬁrms
charge above-marginal cost prices for the add-ons. As in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004),
the ﬁrms respond to the misprediction of future purchases. This model provides an explanation
for high (hidden) fees on bank accounts and credit cards. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) also
discuss how markets do not generally provide incentives for de-biasing naive consumers.
Heidhues and K¨ oszegi (2005) study the pricing of a monopolist when consumers have
reference-dependent preferences and the reference point is the rational expectations equilib-
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and higher price, relative to the reference point. The main predictions are sticky prices (despite
no menu costs) and sales, two common features of pricing. In equilibrium, even if costs are
stochastic, ﬁrms adjust prices seldom in response to cost shifts because consumers suﬀer more
from price increases than they beneﬁt from price cuts. In addition, ﬁrms oﬀer random sales
because the expectation of sales increases the likelihood of purchases at high prices.
These papers point to a dichotomy in the welfare eﬀects of the market response. If the
agents have non-standard preferences, such as self-control problems or loss aversion, but have
rational expectations, the ﬁrms provide welfare-maximizing contracts. The contracts oﬀer
ﬁrst-best commitment devices against the self-control problem (DellaVigna and Malmendier,
2004; Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006) or lower the probability of losses (Heidhues and K¨ oszegi,
2005). If, instead, the agents have non-rational expectations, such as about the self-control or
about the inattention, the proﬁt-maximizing contract is likely to magnify the bias. Firms take
advantage of the wrong expectations in the consumption of the tempting good (DellaVigna
and Malmendier, 2004; Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006) or of the add-on (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006).
Behavioral Labor Economics. Contracting within a ﬁrm is also consistent with this
framework. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) present suggestive evidence using a survey
that workers display loss aversion with respect to nominal wage losses, but not with respect
to real wage losses. For example, 62 percent of respondents ﬁnd unfair a wage cut of 7% in
t h ep r e s e n c eo fn oi n ﬂation, but only 22 percent of respondents ﬁnd unfair a 5% increase in
salaries in presence of 12% inﬂation. Bewley (1999) documents similar patterns in a series of
interviews. In response to a dislike for nominal wage cuts, a proﬁt-maximizing employer should
set wages such that nominal wage cuts would be rare. Card and Hyslop (1997) provide evidence
on this prediction using CPS data. They consider the distribution of year-to-year changes in
the nominal log wage, logwt − logwt−1. In the presence of aversion to nominal wage losses,
we expect a discontinuity in the distribution at logwt −logwt−1 =0 . Rather than introducing
small cuts in the nominal wages that may lower morale and productivity, the employer keeps
wages constant (logwt − logwt−1 = 0), compensating possibly by ﬁring more workers. Card
and Hyslop indeed show that a substantial fraction of the distribution of logwt − logwt−1 is
missing for negative values, despite the presence of measurement error in the wage that tends
to attenuate this ﬁnding. This is an example of a market response to a bias which is likely
to maximize utility for the biased agents. The observed distribution of wages is such that the
employees suﬀer only rarely the cost of nominal wage cuts.
Behavioral Finance. In asset markets, arbitrage in principle is likely to limit the impor-
tance of behavioral biases such as inattention and overconﬁdence for price formation. If an
irrational agent believes that a (fair) coin will land on tails sixty percent of the time, arbitrage
by well-informed agents will keep the odds of tails around ﬁfty percent. In actual ﬁnancial mar-
kets, however, several factors limit the impact of arbitrage. DeLong et al. (1991) considers the
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arbitrageurs are risk-averse and have a limited investment horizon, the noise traders aﬀect the
equilibrium price, despite arbitrage. If noise-traders are, for example, bullish about dot-coms,
they will bid the price of dot-com shares higher. The arbitrageurs do not know whether the
mis-pricing will get even worse in the next period, and given their short horizons (they have
to liquidate the shares next period) they cannot short the shares aggressively enough. DeLong
et al. (1991) also shows that the noise traders are not driven out of the market; under some
conditions, in fact, they outperform the rational traders (since they take more risk).
The recent research in behavioral ﬁnance builds on the noise-trade models to capture the
limits of arbitrage, and hence the relevance of non-standard behavior for asset prices. At the
same time, this literature moved beyond these models in making explicit the source of ‘noise
trading’. In Sections 3.1 and 4.1, for example, we discussed models of overconﬁdence and
limited attention, which make speciﬁc predictions about the non-standard behavior and hence
the eﬀect on returns. The evidence on this class of models is summarized in Shleifer (2000)
and Barberis and Thaler (2003).
Behavioral Corporate Finance. In corporate ﬁnance, the standard theory assumes that
managers maximize company value subject to agency problems, given the demands of rational
investors and creditors. A recent theory, known as market timing, expands this framework
and assumes that investors may have an irrationally high or low valuation of the company.
The CEO rationally responds to the mis-valuation through the equity issuance and merger
decisions. CEOs provide additional shares to investors and undertake mergers when the shares
a r em o s tl i k e l yt ob eo v e r - p r i c e d ,l o w e r i n gt h ewelfare of the biased investors. Market timing
can explain the systematic underperformance of initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) in the 3-5 years
following the IPO (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). According to this interpretation, managers
of private companies go public when the shares of their companies are over-priced, hence
the underperformance of IPOs. Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2006) reviews the evidence
supporting this theory. This theory complements the standard theory that issuance decisions
respond to investment opportunities.
Behavioral Political Economy. Another setting in which we expect an asymmetry
between rational and biased agents is politics. While politicians are experienced agents facing
high-stake incentives and signiﬁcant competition, voters make infrequent low-stake decisions—
whether to vote and for whom. Therefore, we expect political settings to be well-described
by the interaction of rational politicians and voters with non-standard preferences, such as
imperfect memory and limited attention.
Eisensee and Stromberg (2007) provides an example of politicians responding to a bias of
voters, inattention. They consider the decision by US ambassadors to release US aid in the days
following a natural disaster in the country. Ambassadors presumably are more likely to release
aid if they, or the government, get credit for their generosity. To capture this phenomenon,
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items in the US television evening news, or due to major sporting event like the Olympics.
They ﬁnd that the probability of USAID relief is 15 percent lower for disasters occurring on
days with a 2 standard deviation higher intensity of news in the US media. Similarly, the
probability of relief is 30 percent lower in the period of the Olympics. On days in which the
American public is less likely to notice the US generosity, generous acts are less likely to take
place. This is consistent with politician response to limited attention of voters.
Behavioral Institutional Design. While ﬁrms, investors, managers, and politicians may
respond to biases by exploiting them, the response to biases need not be predatory. Societal
rules and institutions can be designed to counter-act the eﬀect of consumer biases and improve
the welfare of consumers. Benartzi and Thaler (2004)’s Save More Tomorrow (SMarT) plan
is an example of one such institutional design for 401(k) savings. In a SMarT plan, the
contribution rate is set to increase at each future wage increase up to a capped level. While
savings increases are the default, employees can opt out of the plan at any time. This plan is
an attractive commitment device to individuals with self-control problems, since the default
applies to future savings rates, rather than current ones. In addition, the plan is designed with
an eye to individuals that are averse to nominal wage cuts (see above), since the increases in
contribution rates occur at the time of pay increases.
Benartzi and Thaler (2004) provide evidence on three implementations of this plan. In the
earliest implementation, the plan is oﬀered to 207 employees that accept to meet with a ﬁnancial
consultant, but do not accept to increase the savings rate immediately, as recommended by
the consultant. Of these 207 individuals, 162 individuals accept the SMarT plan, indicating a
wide-spread demand for commitment. In this subset of 162 individuals, the contribution rate
increases from 3.5 percent to 13.6 percent in just four years. This increase includes the 32
individuals who opted out of the plan by the fourth year. The early results from the other
two implementations of the SMarT plan indicate that the take-up of the plan is lower if it is
oﬀered as an option via mail, as opposedt ow i t ha ni n - p e r s o nm e e t i n g .T h ee ﬀects conditional
on take-up are, however, similarly large. These results suggest that a simple change in defaults
can go a long way toward addressing under-saving. Importantly, while this plan is designed
for individuals with self-control problems, it does not hurt individuals with time-consistent
preferences, since these individuals can switch at any time.
While the evidence in Psychology and Economics can have policy implications, such as in
this case, other considerations suggest caution regarding the policy reach of this evidence. First,
unlike in the Benartzi and Thaler (2004) case, welfare-enhancing policies can be impractical–
for example, no default can help people exercise more. Second, political economy considerations
suggest caution in the implementation of policies (Glaeser, 2006). Nevertheless, behavioral
phenomena should be taken into account alongside standard phenomena in the policy design.
466E m p i r i c a l M e t h o d s
The empirical research in Psychology and Economics discussed in this paper falls into ﬁve
groups: Menu Choice, Natural Experiments, Field Experiments, Correlational Studies, and
Structural Identiﬁcation. Since these methods are broadly used in economics, I discuss the
speciﬁcs of their application to Psychology and Economics.
1. Menu Choice. Assume that we observe both the consumer choice from a menu
{X1,X 2,... XI}, and an outcome xi subsequent to the choice of Xi. The Xisc o u l db et h e
contracts oﬀered by a health club, and xi the attendance to the club, conditional on the choice
of contract Xi (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006). In another example, the Xisc o u l db e
diﬀerent levels of deductible in home insurance, and xi the ensuing number of accidents to the
home, conditional on the deductible chosen (Sydnor, 2006).
In these examples, the standard theory makes a prediction about the outcome xi, condi-
tional on the choice of Xi. If an individual chooses Xi, according to the standard theory it
m u s tb et h ec a s et h a t
Eg(xi)|Xi ≥ ¯ g (11)
for some (usually linear) function g and some known threshold ¯ g. (The direction of the in-
equality is immaterial) If (11) does not hold, the individual should not have chosen Xi.
If we observe the outcome xn
i for a large number N of individuals n =1 ,..., N choosing
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i )/n < ¯ g holds, the data rejects the standard model, and alternative models
can be explored, in our examples models from Psychology and Economics. In the example of
health club memberships, as I discussed in Section 2.1, under the standard model individuals
choosing the monthly contract XM with monthly fee L must believe that pE (xM)|XM ≥ L,
or L/E (xM)|XM ≤ p: the price per expected attendance under the monthly contract should
be lower than the fee p under payment-per-usage.
A strength of the menu-based approach is its simplicity: it relies on a basic principle of
economics, revealed preferences, and the comparison of revealed preferences with observed
behavior. If the two are inconsistent according to the standard theory, the data supports an
alternative theory. A weakness of the approach is the low power of the test. If the test does
not lead to rejection of the standard theory, it does not imply rejection of the alternative
(behavioral) theory since condition (11) is necessary but not suﬃc i e n tf o rt h ec h o i c eo fXi.A n
example is Agarwal et al. (2005), which cannot reject rational expectations about credit card
borrowing, but is also consistent with sizeable over-/under-estimation of borrowing.
2. Natural Experiments. Natural Experiments evaluate the comparative statics of a
model using naturally-occurring variation. Consider two situations, treatment situation T and
control situation C, with respective outcomes xT and xC. Assume that the standard model
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Eg(xT) ≥ Eg(xC)
for some function g; the direction of the inequality is by convenience. The alternative, behav-
ioral model predicts
Eg(xT) <E g(xC).
By computing the sample equivalents of Eg(xT)a n dEg(xC), we can test the standard theory
against the behavioral theory.
T h es i m p l e s tt y p eo fN a t u r a lE x p e r i m e n ti st h eTime Series or Event Study,i nw h i c ht h e
variable x is observed before the change of a situation (the control) and after (the treatment).
An example is Madrian and Shea (2001), in which the contribution to 401(k)s x is observed
before and after a default change. A Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Study compares the change
b e f o r ea n da f t e rt h et r e a t m e n tt ot h ec h a n g eo v e rt h es a m et i m ep e r i o df o r a control (placebo)
group. An example is DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) who compare the change in voting for
towns where Fox News is introduced to the change in voting for control towns. The placebo
group allows a control for common time trends.
An advantage of Natural Experiments is that they identify a treatment eﬀect occurring
in the ﬁeld, with a guarantee of high external validity. A disadvantage is the possibility that
the treatment may be endogenous and correlated with omitted variables that contaminate
the causal inference. In principle, the change in default in Madrian and Shea (2001) could
be due to the demand from new employees of more generous retirement plans; similarly, the
introduction of Fox News could be correlated to political trends. These studies need to present
evidence on the selection into the treatment group.
3. Field Experiments. Field Experiments (Harrison and List, 2004), like Natural Exper-
iments, evaluate the comparative statics of the standard model and of a behavioral model. The
diﬀerence is that in Field Experiments the treatment and control group are determined via an
explicit randomization. An example is conducted by List (2003), who studies the endowment
eﬀect assigning sport cards to randomly-determined groups of card traders. The explicit ran-
domization is an advantage of this approach since it guarantees internal validity, that is, the
conditions for causal inference. This advantage comes sometimes at the cost of lower external
validity, since in some important markets it is diﬃcult to run Field Experiments. In addition,
the sample size is often limited by the cost of the randomization.
Field Experiments, as well as Natural Experiments, in Psychology and Economics use two
types of identiﬁcation strategies. The ﬁrst is to study environments in which the standard
theory predicts there should be no eﬀect of the treatment, while an alternative behavioral
theory does. Examples are Ausubel (1999) and Bertrand et al. (2006) on credit card and
loan oﬀers among the Field Experiments, and Huberman and Regev (2001) on inattention in
ﬁnancial markets among the Natural Experiments. The second strategy is to consider treat-
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to the alternative behavioral theory. An example is Lee and McCrary (2005), who show that
crime rates are unaﬀected by the sharp change in punishment for oﬀenders occurring at the
18th birthday–a ﬁnding indicative of myopia. (Incidentally, this study relies on a Regression
Discontinuity design, a variant of Natural Experiments)
4. Correlational Studies. Correlational Studies identify a correlation between two
variables, say, x and y. Assume that the standard theory makes the prediction
Cov(x,y) ≥ 0
(again, the direction of the inequality is by convenience), while a behavioral theory makes the
prediction
Cov(x,y) < 0.
An example is Camerer et al. (2001) where x and y are hours worked and daily wage of cab
drivers. A common application in Psychology and Economics is to the study of inter-personal
psychological types. These studies use a proxy for a psychological trait (the x variable), such
as overconﬁdence or impatience, and analyze the correlation of this proxy with a behavior
(the y variable.)29 For example, Malmendier and Tate (2005 and forthcoming) correlate late
exercise of stock option, a proxy of CEO overconﬁdence, with investment and merger activity.
An advantage of Correlational Studies is that they do not require a special design, as
experiments do. The lack of an experimental design, however, complicates the inference and
lowers the internal validity of these studies, since the observed covariance may be due to
alternative explanations. For example, as I discussed above, ﬂuctuations in cab driver wage
c a nb ed r i v e nb ys h i f t si nd i s u t i l i t yo fe ﬀort rather than shifts in demand, as assumed by
Camerer et al. (2001). Similarly, the personality proxy may be correlated with unobserved
variables, such as private information of the CEO. As a result, these papers need to undertake
additional empirical tests to address the alternative explanations.
5. Structural Identiﬁcation. While the above methods are used to qualitatively test the
standard theory, they are typically not designed to provide point estimates for the parameters.
Studies with Structural Identiﬁcation are designed to draw this type of inference and quantify
the extent of the non-standard preferences or biases. These papers estimate a fully-speciﬁed
model. Examples are studies estimating the (β,δ) model of self-control, such as Laibson,
Repetto, and Tobacman (2006) on life-cycle accumulation and Paserman (forthcoming) on job
search.
An advantage of this method is that the parameter estimates can be used for welfare and
policy evaluations. Paserman (forthcoming), for example, simulates the eﬀect of labor market
29Interestingly, the studies that emphasize personality types run counter to a tenet of social psychology, that
the situation appears to explain behavior more than the personality (Ross and Nisbett, 1991).
49policies for individuals with the extent of self-control problems estimated in the data. This
evaluation is hard to perform without parameter estimates.
While the reliance on a model permits quantitative inferences and welfare evaluations,
it often comes at the cost of reduced transparency of the results. The parameter estimates
depend on the full set of assumptions. For this reason, these papers are often accompanied
by reduced-form results that provide intuition. Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2006), for
example, builds on Angeletos et al. (2001). Conlin, O’Donoghue, and Vogelsang (forthcoming)
on projection bias provides both reduced-form and structural estimates.
A middle ground between reduced-form results and Structural Identiﬁcation are calibra-
tions, in which quantitative predictions from a model are compared to the data for a feasible
range of parameter values. In examples such as Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Sydnor (2006),
calibrations play two key roles: (i) showing that the standard models can explain a ﬁnding
only for implausible parameter values, in these two cases implausibly high risk aversion; (ii)
showing that behavioral models match a ﬁnding for parameter values that are consistent with
the experimental evidence, in these cases on reference-dependent preferences.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this survey, I summarized the ﬁeld evidence on three classes of deviations from the standard
model: non-standard preferences, non-standard beliefs, and non-standard decision-making. I
discussed how rational agents in the market respond to these non-standard features. I con-
cluded with a summary of the empirical methodologies used in this research. As this survey
documented, deviations from the standard model are not conﬁned to laboratory decisions.
Most phenomena that are important in laboratory experiments also aﬀect decisions in a va-
riety of economic settings. Hence, I expect that economists will increasingly take behavioral
phenomena into account in their analysis.
Why don’t market forces eliminate non-standard behavior? While a full discussion of
this objection is beyond the scope of this article, I address two related arguments, one on
experience and another on aggregation. A ﬁrst argument is that experience reduces non-
standard behavior. Indeed, experience appears to mitigate the endowment eﬀect (List, 2003
and 2004). Palacios-Huerta and Volji (2007) provide concordant evidence on the eﬀect of
experience on the ability to perform backward induction. They consider the centipede game.
Chess players, who have to routinely perform backward induction-type reasoning, come close
in their play to the predictions of backward induction, in sharp contrast to college students.
However, it would be wrong to conclude, based on this evidence, that behavioral phenom-
ena should not matter in the ﬁeld. I list four reasons. (i) In a number of economic decisions,
feedback is infrequent (such as in house purchases) or noisy (such as in ﬁnancial investments),
and hence most individuals are inexperienced. (ii) Experience can exacerbate a bias if indi-
50viduals are not Bayesian learners. Haigh and List (2004) use a simple investment game and
show that professional investors display signiﬁcantly more myopic loss aversion (see Section
2.2) than students. Presumably, the short-term incentives in the workplace teach these in-
vestors to frame problems narrowly, contrary to the prediction of the standard theory. (iii) In
principle, debiasing by experienced agents can be a substitute for direct experience. However,
as Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show, experienced agents such as ﬁrms typically have little or no
incentive to debias individuals. (iv) Finally, not all non-standard features should be mitigated
by experience. Experience should not aﬀect social preferences any more than it should aﬀect
preferences for the characteristics of cars.
A second argument is that, even if experience or debiasing do not eliminate the biases, the
biases will not aﬀect aggregate market outcomes. The argument is made forcefully in ﬁnancial
markets: given arbitrage, the rational investors set prices. However, as we discussed, the limits
to arbitrage (DeLong et al., 1991) imply that individuals with non-standard features will in
general aﬀect stock prices. In addition, in most settings, there is no plausible incentive to
eliminate a bias and hence the eﬀect of non-standard behavior aggregates linearly. If a share
of the population procrastinates saving for retirement, the aggregate savings rate will reﬂect
proportionally the under-saving by this group. This is true unless a diﬀerent institutional
design is put in place, such as the SMarT plan (Benartzi and Thaler, 2004). (Notice that this
plan was put in place not by market forces, but by academics).
Finally, the papers on behavioral IO indicate that the non-standard features, instead of
having no impact, can in fact have a disproportionate impact on market outcomes. Lee and
Malmendier (2007) provide a telling example regarding overbidding in eBay auctions. Lee and
Malmendier deﬁne a case of overbidding when the ﬁnal auction price is higher than a posted
price for the same good available on eBay itself. They focus on an item for which the posted
price is essentially always available and is stable, and hence should be an upper bound for the
bids in a rational model. The authors show that 42 percent of auctions end at a price above
the posted price, a conclusion robust to the inclusion of shipping costs, to diﬀerences in item
quality and in seller reputation. The key aggregation point is that this behavior is generated
by many fewer than 42 percent of overbidders. In fact, only 17 percent of bidders ever overbid.
The auction design, however, is such that the overbidders determine the ﬁnal price.
To conclude, a natural question is what empirical research in Psychology and Economics
will look like in the future. Methodologically, I expect future research to continue using mostly
the methods encountered in this overview, ﬁeld experiments (such as List, 2003 and Falk,
forthcoming), natural experiments (such as Madrian and Shea, 2001 and DellaVigna and Ka-
plan, 2007), and inference from menu choice (such as DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006 and
Sydnor, 2006). Studies that provide structural estimates of the parameters (such as Laibson
et al., 2006 and Conlin et al., forthcoming) will need to address a number of open questions.
For example, can models of (β,δ) preferences predict choice in diﬀerent decisions for ﬁxed
51parameters β, ˆ β, and δ? The evidence from the few existing papers suggests that this may be
the case, but more evidence is in order. This estimation would beneﬁt from the availability
of data sets with multiple decisions by the same individual. While individuals are likely to
diﬀer in their preferences and beliefs, we expect the same individual to behave consistently
if the existing models capture the behavior accurately.30 It is also possible that new, more
parsimonious models of the phenomena presented in this survey will emerge, as Fudenberg
(2006) predicts.
As for the topics, future research is likely to reduce the imbalance across ﬁelds in economics
and across topics in psychology. While the research in behavioral ﬁnance and consumption-
savings is very active, relatively few studies, instead, have tackled mortgage markets, devel-
opment, and political decisions, ﬁelds ripe for exploration. Future research is also likely to
explore psychological phenomena that have been largely neglected. For example, emotions,
automatic processing, and implicit discrimination are likely to matter for economic decisions
such as divorce, judicial sentencing, and policing. Ten years from now, we will hopefully be
able to assess quantitatively which psychological factors matter in which decisions.
I identify two speciﬁc areas for future research: the market interaction between standard
and non-standard agents, as in Section 5, and public policy applications. The market inter-
action is likely to ﬁnd several additional applications, for example to the interaction between
politicians and voters. In addition, this area is likely to investigate the judgmental biases, such
as overconﬁdence, of experienced agents such as managers and politicians. The area of pub-
lic policy is a recent application of the research in Psychology and Economics, mainly in the
context of retirement decisions. The 2006 Congress enacted a bill on Automatic Savings and
P e n s i o nP r o t e c t i o nA c tthat was motivated by the research on defaults and on the SMarT plan.
This law gives incentives to companies to adopt 401(k) plans with automatic enrollment and
automatic increases in savings. Future research will tell whether this is an isolated application
of Psychology and Economics or the ﬁrst of several.
30In a laboratory experiment, Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (forthcoming) use repeated decisions on giving to
another subject to identify types of subjects with diﬀerent social preferences. Their results suggest substantial
heterogeneity.
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